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Abstract. One of the great regulatory challenges of the Internet era-indeed, one of
today's most pressing privacy questions-is how to define the limits of government access
to personal data stored in the cloud. This is particularly true today because the cloud has
gone global, raising a number of questions about the proper reach of one state's authority
over cloud-based data. The prevailing response to these questions by scholars,
practitioners, and major Internet companies like Google and Facebook has been to argue
that data is different. Data is "unterritorial," they argue, and therefore incompatible with
existing territorial notions of jurisdiction. This Article challenges this view.
The Article argues that the jurisdictional challenges presented by the global cloud are not
conceptually as novel as they seem. Despite the technological wizardry of modern life, the
"cloud" is actually a network of storage drives bolted to a particular territory, and there is
substantial case law suggesting that courts think of data as a physical object. Moreover,
even if the cloud were a free-floating ether, data can be thought of as an intangible asset,
like money or debt, which flows across borders; courts have been adjudicating such
jurisdictional disputes for centuries. These precedents suggest numerous grounds for states
to assert jurisdiction over data-not a single test, as major Internet companies claim.
After showing that these jurisdictional problems are not unprecedented, the Article draws
from these precedents and outlines practical steps that courts, Congress, and the President
can take to alleviate jurisdictional conflicts over the cloud. As Microsoft's cross-border
dispute with the U.S. Department of Justice works its way through the courts, the
President negotiates a treaty with the United Kingdom regarding cross-border access to
the cloud, and Congress rewrites the Electronic Communications Privacy Act, finding a
grounded approach to addressing this problem-one rooted in longstanding jurisdictional
and conflicts principles-has never been more critical.
Assistant Professor, University of Kentucky College of Law. The Author thanks Jack
Goldsmith, Ryan Goodman, Orin Kerr, Matthew Perault, Jennifer Granick, Tino
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Introduction
On December 4, 2013, a magistrate judge in the Southern District of
New York issued a search warrant for the contents and metadata associated
with an e-mail account stored by Microsoft.1 Microsoft produced the relevant
data stored on its American servers.2 But Microsoft, like many Internet
companies, uses data centers located around the world to balance data loads and
ensure that a user's data3 is promptly available wherever the user accesses it.
4
Much of this particular customer's data was stored on the company's data
center in Ireland.5 The company therefore refused to hand over that data on
the grounds that the Stored Communications Act (SCA),6 which is part of the
Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA),7  does not apply
extraterritorially.8 A district judge was unconvinced and upheld the warrant.9
A number of amici have argued that allowing the U.S. government to compel
1. See In re Warrant to Search a Certain E-mail Account Controlled & Maintained by
Microsoft Corp., 15 F. Supp. 3d 466, 467-68 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) [hereinafter Microsoft E-mail
Search Warrant Case], appeal docketed sub nom. Microsoft Corp. v. United States, No. 14-
2985-cv (2d Cir. argued Sept. 9,2015).
2. Id. at 468.
3. This Article will refer to data as a mass noun, similar to "information."
4. Microsoft alleged that it operates more than one hundred data centers in forty
countries where it stores data for more than one billion customers. Microsoft's
Objections to the Magistrate's Order Denying Microsoft's Motion to Vacate in Part a
Search Warrant Seeking Customer Information Located Outside the United States at 8,
Microsoft E-mail Search Warrant Case, 15 F. Supp. 3d 466 (No. 13 Mag. 2814) [hereinafter
Microsoft's Objections].
5. The user signed up with a non-U.S. country code, which led Microsoft to store the data
in its Irish data centers. See Microsoft E-mail Search Warrant Case, 15 F. Supp. 3d at 467
("[B]ased on the 'country code' that the customer enters at registration, Microsoft may
migrate the account to the datacenter in Dublin. When this is done, all content and
most noncontent information associated with the account is deleted from servers in
the United States." (citation omitted)).
6. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701-12 (2014). Congress passed the SCA in order to ensure a measure of
privacy for individuals whose communications are held remotely by third-party
providers of communications and remote storage services-communications that are
not protected by the Fourth Amendment. For a short history of the SCA, see Orin S.
Kerr, The Next Generation Communications Privacy Act, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 373, 378-85
(2014).
7. Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848
(codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701-12, 3121-27). In addition to the provisions of
the SCA, ECPA also placed limitations on the use of pen registers-devices used to track
the numbers called by a particular phone-and it extended the Wiretap Act's
limitations on interception from telephone calls to computer data. See Kerr, supra
note 6, at 382-83.
8. See Microsoft E-mail Search Warrant Case, 15 F. Supp. 3d at 470.
9. Order at 1, Microsoft E-mail Search Warrant Case, 15 F. Supp. 3d 466 (No. 13 Mag. 2814).
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the data would encroach on foreign sovereignty,10 and Ireland filed an amicus
brief to assert its interest in the matter.11 The case is currently pending in the
Second Circuit.
12
The Microsoft Corp. case is only the most recent symptom of a much larger
problem: while many people now store their most personal data in the cloud-
that is, on remote servers scattered around the globe-there is no settled
understanding of who has jurisdiction over that data.13 Companies and
countries have taken a number of different positions-some incompatible with
each other-regarding the reach of the state's jurisdiction over Internet data.14
10. See, e.g., Brief of Amici Curiae AT&T Corp. et al. in Support of Appellant Microsoft
Corp. at 3, Microsoft Corp. v. United States, No. 14-2985-cv (2d Cir. Dec. 15, 2014); Brief
of Verizon Communications, Inc. et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Appellant at 16,
Microsoft Corp., No. 14-2985-cv (2d Cir. Dec. 15, 2014); Brief Amicus Curiae of Electronic
Frontier Foundation in Support of Microsoft Corp. at 11-14, Microsoft E-mail Search
Warrant Case, 15 F. Supp. 3d 466 (No. 13 Mag. 2814).
11. Brief of Amicus Curiae Ireland at 1-3, Microsoft Corp., No. 14-2985-cv (2d Cir. Dec. 23,
2014).
12. See Microsoft Corp., No. 14-2985-cv (2d Cir. argued Sept. 9, 2015). For a rough transcript
of the oral argument, see Transcript of Oral Argument, Microsoft Corp., No. 14-2985-cv,
https://lawfare.s3-us-west-2.amazonaws.com/staging/090915%20hearing%20rough.txt.
13. The Article will use the term "data" to refer to personal information that has been
digitized and made capable of uploading to the Internet. A letter written with ink on
paper is "data" of a certain kind, of course, but this Article is concerned with the
jurisdictional implications of taking that handwritten letter, digitizing it, and storing it
online in the cloud. Cloud computing is characterized by users' remote storage of data
and services, which can be accessed anywhere on a network. See PETER MELL &
TIMOTHY GRANCE, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, SPECIAL PUB. 800-145, THE NIST
DEFINITION OF CLOUD COMPUTING: RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF
STANDARDS AND TECHNOLOGY 2 (2011); see also Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2491
(2014) ("Cloud computing is the capacity of Internet-connected devices to display data
stored on remote servers rather than on the device itself."). It is difficult to describe the
problem without belying a particular answer to it because the meaning of the phrase
"the cloud," and who has jurisdiction over it, are the heart of the dispute. For example,
it is tempting to refer to "foreign data" and "data stored abroad" in order to refer to data
that is beyond the state's jurisdictional reach. But doing so presumes an answer-the
location of the data-to the question of how to define the state's jurisdictional reach.
The word "data" is used here as a generic term to refer to content, basic subscriber
information, and metadata.
14. See Vidal-Hall v. Google Inc, [2014] EWHC (QB) 13 (rejecting Google's contention that
the court did not have jurisdiction to hear a tort claim because the act complained of
did not occur within the United Kingdom); Kerr, supra note 6, at 407 ("So what
determines territoriality? The location of the data? The company? The employee? Or
the requesting party?"); Warwick Ashford, Google Claims It Is Not Subject to UK Privacy
Laws, COMPUTERWEEKLY (Aug. 19, 2013, 8:12 AM), http://www.computerweekly
.com/news/2240203739/Google-claims-it-is-not-subject-to-UK-privacy-laws (noting
Google's domicile theory of jurisdiction); Christopher Williams, Google Argues UK
Privacy Laws Do Not Apply to It, TELEGRAPH (Aug. 18, 2013, 5:26 PM BST), http://www
.telegraph.co.uk/technology/google/10250801/Google-argues-UK-privacy-laws-do
-not-apply-to-it.html ("Google has argued that as an American company it is not
footnote continued on next page
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These jurisdictional disagreements have wide-ranging implications for law
enforcement and individual privacy, especially now that the cloud is global.15
Consider, for example, what will happen when the Internal Revenue Service
(IRS) seeks to collect back taxes by levying a Bitcoin account-how should a
court determine whether the IRS has jurisdiction over the virtual currency?
16
Or consider the applicability of the Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act (HIPAA) of 199617 to personal health data stored in the
cloud-how should a court decide the location of the data for the purposes of
determining whether it falls within the reach of HIPAA? Relatedly, what
should a court do when, as in Microsoft Corp., two nations assert jurisdiction
over the same piece of data? As that Second Circuit case works its way through
the courts, Congress considers reforming ECPA,18 and the United States and
covered by British privacy laws. It said there was 'no jurisdiction' for the case to be
heard [in the United Kingdom] because its consumer services are provided by Google
Inc, based in Silicon Valley, rather than Google UK."); see also Orin Kerr, Verizon
Responds to My Blog Posts on the Foreign E-mail Case, WASH. POST: VOLOKH CONSPIRACY
(July 30, 2014), http://wpo.st/ZLg0l ("At bottom, does this case involve regulation of
providers that are inside the U.S. or data that is outside the U.S.?").
15. See Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and the Global Internet, 67 STAN. L. REV. 285, 287
(2015) ("The last twenty years have witnessed a dramatic globalization of the Internet.").
16. Bitcoin is a digital currency that is managed by a peer-to-peer process and does not
technically reside anywhere-rather, the data that creates the code gives it value among
other Bitcoin traders. It is classified by the U.S. Treasury Department as a decentralized
virtual currency. See The Present and Future Impact of Virtual Currency: Joint Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Natl Sec. & Int'l Trade & Fin. & the Subcomm. on Ecor Pol'y of the S.
Comm on Banking, Hous. & Urban Affairs, 113th Cong. 33 (2013) (statement of Jennifer
Shasky Calvery, Director, Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, Department of the
Treasury). The U.S. Internal Revenue Code provides that the government may collect
delinquent taxes by "levy," which is the equivalent of a seizure. I.R.C. §§ 6331-44 (2014);
United States v. New England Merchs. Nat'l Bank, 465 F. Supp. 83, 86 (D. Mass. 1979)
("Levy is the equivalent of seizure...."). Courts have not yet weighed in on the question
of Bitcoin's location for tax purposes. However, at least one court has upheld the
Securities and Exchange Commission's authority to regulate investment instruments
based on Bitcoin, suggesting that a suit may proceed if the court can assert personal
jurisdiction over a defendant with control over those assets. See SEC v. Shavers,
No. 4:13-CV-416, 2013 WL 4028182, at "2 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 6,2013).
17. Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18, 26,
29, and 42 U.S.C.). Sections 261 through 264 of HIPAA require the Department of Health
and Human Services to promulgate standards-now known as the Privacy Rule-
regarding the storage and dissemination of electronic health data. See OFFICE FOR CIVIL
RIGHTS, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., SUMMARY OF THE HIPAA PRIVACY RULE
(2003).
18. See Law Enforcement Access to Data Stored Abroad Act, S. 512, 114th Cong. (2015);
Electronic Communications Privacy Act Amendments Act of 2015, S. 356, 114th Cong.
(2015).
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United Kingdom negotiate a treaty regarding government access to data stored
in the cloud,19 these questions have never been more pressing.
Fortunately, these questions are not as novel as some scholars suggest. A
number of lawyers and academics have recently made the case for "data
exceptionalism," suggesting that cloud-stored data is fundamentally
incompatible with existing territorial limits on jurisdiction.20 But, despite the
wizardry and wonder of modern technological advances, cloud-based ata is
not conceptually novel enough to support this view.21 Data has physical and
intangible features, both of which provide helpful precedent for states seeking
to assert jurisdiction over that data.22 Cloud-based data resides on servers-
essentially large hard drives-and wherever those servers sit, they are subject
to territorial assertions of jurisdiction.23 Even if this data were somehow stored
19. See Ellen Nakashima & Andrea Peterson, The British Want to Come to America-with
Wiretap Orders and Search Warrants, WASH. POST (Feb. 4,2016), http://wpo.st/kFcDl.
20. See, e.g., Damon C. Andrews & John M. Newman, Personal Jurisdiction and Choice of Law
in the Cloud, 73 MD. L. REV. 313, 388 (2013) (arguing that the cloud represents
unprecedented legal challenges, and that existing jurisdiction and choice-of-law rules
are in "dire need" of fundamental change); Zachary D. Clopton, Territoriality,
Technology, and National Security, 83 U. CHI. L. REV. 45 (2016) (making the case for
"technology exceptionalism"-the argument that courts ought to evaluate territoriality
differently in the context of technology); David Cole & Federico Fabbrini, Bridging the
Transatlantic Divide The United States, the European Union, and the Protection of Privacy
Across Borders, INT'L J. CONST. L. (forthcoming 2016) (manuscript at 14-55) (explaining
the limits of the existing international regime to regulate the global cloud and calling
for a transatlantic privacy agreement); Jennifer Daskal, The Un-Territoriality of Data,
125 YALE L.J. 326, 397 (2015) (arguing that "data is everywhere and anywhere," making
it incompatible with traditional notions of territorial sovereignty); Recent Case-District
Court Holds that SCA Warrant Obligates US. Provider to Produce Emails Stored on Foreign
Servers, 128 HARv. L. REv. 1019, 1026 (2015) (arguing that because "data, including
fragments and copies, can be stored everywhere," the territoriality requirement of the
SCA makes little sense and suggesting that Congress should rely on the location of the
service provider rather than the location of the data to determine the reach of the Act);
Ian Brown et al., Towards Multilateral Standards for Surveillance Reform 2-3 (2015)
(unpublished manuscript), https://cihr.eu/wp-content/uploads/2015/01/Brown-et-al
_TowardsMultilateral_2015.pdf (describing the limits of national conflicts-of-laws
rules to adequately delimit government access to data stored in the global cloud,
pointing to the need for a multilateral agreement); Time for an International Convention
on Government Access to Data, MICROSOFT ON ISSUES (Jan. 20, 2014), http://blogs
.microsoft.com/on-the-issues/2014/01/20/time-for-an-international-convention-on
-government-access-to-data (calling for an international convention to regulate
government access to personal data stored in the cloud).
21. See infra Part II.
22. See infra Part II.B.
23. See Kate Vinton, The Feds Explain How They Seized the Silk Road Servers, FORBES
(Sept. 8, 2014 11:02 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/katevinton/2014/09/08/the
-feds-explain-how-they-seized-the-silk-road-servers (explaining how the FBI worked
with Icelandic authorities to search servers in Reykjavik, Iceland, that hosted an online
bazaar for illegal activities).
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in a free-floating ether, it would not be so different from other forms of
intangible assets, like intellectual property and debts, which have been the
subject of extraterritorial seizures going back many years.24 Contrary to
prevailing wisdom, jurisdiction over cloud-based data has nearly everything to
do with territoriality-it requires an inquiry into the location of the data, the
domicile of the data controller, the location of the crime, the citizenship of the
victim, and/or the citizenship of the perpetrator.25 Of course, these different
bases for jurisdiction mean that the same piece of data may be subject to a
number of different jurisdictions at the same time. But overlapping and
conflicting laws are not a novel legal problem either; rather, conflicts of laws
casebooks are filled with such disputes, and the fact that the subject of the
dispute is Internet data changes very little as a conceptual matter.
26
Showing that the jurisdictional challenges presented by the global cloud
are not conceptually novel does not resolve those problems, but it does suggest
a number of helpful insights drawn from past precedents. For example, if data
is not as different as many have suggested, then states need not commit to
narrowly defining their authority over data based on a single test, such as the
location of the data or the domicile of the company.27 Major Internet firms
have adopted strikingly different views about the relevant test for when states
have the authority to compel data. Microsoft treats the relevant test as the
location of the data; under this test, states have the authority to compel data
stored only on servers in their territory.28 Google and Facebook appear to take
24. See infra Part II.B.l.a; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF
THE UNITED STATES § 455 reporters' note 2 (AM. LAW INST. 1987) (reviewing cases going
back decades regarding the seizure of intangible assets); Aaron D. Simowitz, Siting
Intangibles, 48 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 259, 270-92 (2015) (describing how courts
determine jurisdictional disputes over intangible assets such as intellectual property,
debts, stock, and more).
25. See infra Part III.A.
26. See infra Part IV. This discussion may give some readers d6jA vu-data exceptionalists
make a number of the same arguments as the early cyber anarchists. This response
therefore closely tracks the responses to the cyber anarchist camp, most notably from
Goldsmith and Wu. See, e.g., JACK GOLDSMITH & TIM Wu, WHO CONTROLS THE
INTERNET?: ILLUSIONS OF A BORDERLESS WORLD (2006) (describing the enduring power
of states to regulate the Internet through controls over infrastructure); Jack L.
Goldsmith, Against Cyberanarchy, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 1199 (1998) (arguing that many
scholars exaggerate the difficulties of state regulation of the Internet) [hereinafter
Goldsmith, Against Cyberanarchy]; Jack Goldsmith, Unilateral Regulation of the Internet A
Modest Defence, 11 EUR. J. INT'L L. 135, 138 (2000) (defending the idea that it is within
states' prerogative to regulate extraterritorial Internet activity that has harmful local
effects) [hereinafter Goldsmith, Unilateral Regulation].
27. See infra Part III-A.
28. Microsoft argues that the search and seizure of e-mails on a global network of servers
occur at the location where the e-mails are stored. Brief for Appellant at 31-33,
Microsoft Corp. v. United States, No. 14-2985-cv (2d Cir. Dec. 8, 2014). Implicit in this
footnote continued on next page
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a different view, suggesting in a number of different contexts that states have
authority to compel data only if the data controller (the company) is domiciled
in that state's territory.2 9 Neither view is right as a matter of longstanding
principles of jurisdiction. Well-established precedent suggests that if a court
has personal jurisdiction over the defendant or the defendant's assets-in this
case, an Internet company or its offices, servers, or bank accounts-it can
lawfully compel the data in connection with a legitimate law enforcement
effort, regardless of where the data is stored or where the company is
domiciled.
30
Moreover, a rich vein of conflicts jurisprudence suggests that states can
take simple steps to reduce jurisdictional disputes with other states.3 1 For
argument is a claim that the relevant jurisdictional test for locating e-mails on a global
server is the location of server (or servers) where the e-mails are resting.
29. In a wide range of lawsuits around the world, Google and Facebook have both
articulated that the relevant jurisdictional hook for determining which states can
compel stored data ought to be the domicile of the corporation, which for both
companies is the United States. See, e.g., Case C-131/12, Google Spain SL v. Agencia
Espafiola de Protecci6n de Datos (AEPD), 2014 E.C.R. para. 60, http://curia.europa.eu
/juris/document/document.js.text=&docid=152065&doclang=EN (holding that the
European Court of Justice had jurisdiction over Google Inc. under the European
Council's Data Protection Directive 95/46 because Google set up a subsidiary in Spain
to sell advertising there and directed its services to Spain's inhabitants); Ashford, supra
note 14 (describing Google's view that domicile of the corporation decides
jurisdiction-not location of the data); Miranda Prynne, Britons Should Be Able to Sue
Google for Privacy Breaches, Court Hears, TELEGRAPH (Dec. 16, 2013, 3:06 PM GMT)
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/google/10520755/Britons-should-be-able-to
-sue-Google-for-privacy-breaches-court-hears.htm (noting that upon being sued for
surreptitiously collecting data about British Apple Safari users, Google "asked London's
High Court to throw out the case claiming it is not governed by the British justice
system"). For examples of Facebook's views, see Douez v. Facebook, Inc., 2014 BCSC
953, paras. 134-35 (Can. B.C.), rev'd, 2015 BCCA 279 (Can. B.C.) (holding the court had
jurisdiction due to a British Columbian statutory cause of action, despite Facebook's
argument that proper jurisdiction was in California); Aurelien Breeden, French Court
Rules It Has Jurisdiction over Facebook in Nude Painting Case, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 6, 2015,
10.17 AM), http://nyti.ms/lBb3G5p (describing a French court's determination that i
had jurisdiction to hear a dispute over Facebook's takedown of a user account, despite
Facebook's argument that the terms of service called for all disputes to be resolved in
California); and Richard Chirgwin, Belgium Privacy Commish Ambushes Facebook with
Lawsuit, REGISTER (June 16, 2015, 5:03 AM), http://www.theregister.co.uk/2015/06/16
/belgium-privacy-commish-ambushes-facebook-with-lawsuit (describing Facebook's
assertion that "Belgium doesn't have jurisdiction").
30. See infra Part III.B.
31. For example, Congress could elect to narrow the state's ability to access data in the
cloud for privacy reasons, and the President might agree with another country to
voluntarily limit the state's reach into the cloud within these jurisdictional limits. As
Larry Kramer explains:
[lit is not necessary to rely on the Constitution, for the principles of mutual accommodation
and comity underlying its prohibitions suggest the result as a matter of ordinary
interpretation. That is, while a state's laws may indeed reflect the judgment of the state's
footnote continued on next page
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example, one of the lessons of transnational itigation regarding offshore bank
accounts-perhaps the best analogy to offshore data storage-is that blocking
statutes, which prevent citizens from complying with foreign law
enforcement requests, greatly exacerbate conflicts of laws. Repealing those
statutes is therefore one of the simplest steps that states can take to encourage
regulatory harmonization and reduce conflicts.32 The implication of this
insight for cloud-based data is simple but far reaching: it suggests reforming
many states' privacy statutes, which often operate as blocking statutes.
Applying this insight to U.S. law, for example, would mean reforming ECPA.
33
While there are a number of ECPA reform proposals pending in Congress,
34
and ECPA reform has been widely discussed in the press,35 none of the current
proposals would have any effect on the statute's blocking features.36 This
Article therefore applies insights from transnational conflicts cases to ECPA
reform efforts, suggesting a number of specific changes that might minimize
cross-border conflicts over government access to data.3 7 These changes are a
promising alternative to the fraught idea of a global treaty on government
access to data.
38
This is the first Article to look to longstanding jurisdictional principles to
assess the state's ability to compel personal data stored on the global cloud.
39
lawmakers about how best to organize society, each state presumably recognizes that other
states can have different views about what is best. Conflicts are inevitable, and it is necessary
to develop means of avoiding or resolving them. The presumption that a state's law does not
reach cases with which the state has no contact is one such means: it avoids conflicts while
increasing the utility of all states by facilitating each state's ability to regulate matters that are
connected to that state.
Larry Kramer, Rethinking Choice of Law, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 277, 294-95 (1990).
32. See infra Part IV.B.
33. See infra Part V.A.
34. See supra note 18.
35. See, e.g., Editorial, Adapting Old Laws to New Technologie Must Microsoft Turn Over
Emails on Irish Servers?, N.Y. TIMES (July 27, 2014), http://nyti.ms/lteVwpx; Somini
Sengupta, Updating an E-mail Law from the Last Century, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 24, 2013),
http://nyti.ms/YSV2Ck.
36. See Andrew K. Woods, ECPA Reform. A Primer, JUST SECURITY (Sept. 16, 2015, 9:59 AM),
https://www.justsecurity.org/26120/ecpa-reform-primer (summarizing five competing
proposals to reform ECPA).
37. See infra Part V.A.
38. See infra Part V.D.
39. I am aware of one article that looks at how the cloud affects jurisdiction and choice of
law, but the authors conclude that the cloud is so radically novel that it requires
entirely new legal concepts. Andrews & Newman, supra note 20, at 372-73 ("[T]he
territorial-based conception of states and nation-states may be quickly becoming
archaic in an increasingly connected world, calling into question the validity of choice-
of-law methodologies that were developed in the Pre-Network Era." (footnote
omitted)).
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There is a large and growing literature on the U.S. government's surveillance
of Internet data4 and, relatedly, American search and seizure law.41 These are
important inquiries, to be sure, but existing statutory and constitutional law
are insufficient on their own to settle these antecedent jurisdictional
questions.42 Early Internet jurisdiction scholarship touches on these questions
only obliquely.4 3 That scholarship was largely about spillovers: behavior in one
state spilling over into another state via the Internet.44 The jurisdictional
question in such a case is whether a nation may "apply its law to
extraterritorial behavior with substantial local effects."45 This Article is
concerned with something else: how a nation can apply its laws to local
behavior with local effects when the data related to the act happens to be stored
in the global cloud.
40. For a recent sampling, see Ryan Calo, Can Americans Resist Surveillance?, 83 U. CHI. L.
REV. 23 (2016); Ashley Deeks, An International Legal Framework for Surveillance, 55 VA. J.
INT'L L. 291 (2015); Orin S. Kerr, A Rule of Lenity for National Security Surveillance Law,
100 VA. L. REV. 1513 (2014); Neil M. Richards, The Dangers of Surveillance, 126 HARV. L.
REV. 1934 (2013); and Christopher Slobogin, Standing and Covert Surveillance, 42 PEPP. L.
REV. 517 (2015).
41. See, e.g., Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, The Internet of Things and the Fourth Amendment of
Effects, 104 CALIF. L. REV. (forthcoming 2016); Kerr, supra note 15; Orin S. Kerr, The
Mosaic Theory of the Fourth Amendment, 111 MICH. L. REV. 311 (2012); Orin S. Kerr,
Searches and Seizures in a Digital World, 119 HARV. L. REV. 531 (2005).
42. The only brief, out of the dozens filed, in the Microsoft Corp. litigation that recognizes
this fact is Apple's. See Brief in Support of Appellant Microsoft, Inc. by Apple Inc. as
Amicus Curiae at 10-14, Microsoft Corp. v. United States, No. 14-2985-cv (2d Cir.
Dec. 15, 2014) (arguing that the case raises fundamental conflict-of-laws and comity
concerns, which were ignored by the lower court). This is consistent with the Supreme
Court's decisions on prescriptive jurisdiction. See, e.g., Morrison v. Nat'l Austl. Bank
Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 272 (2010) (noting the distinction between the permissible scope of
prescriptive jurisdiction pursuant to customary international law and what Congress
in fact authorized by statute). For further discussion of this distinction, see Simowitz,
supra note 24, at 302 n.159.
43. See, e.g., Goldsmith, Against Cyberanarchy, supra note 26, at 1202-05 (describing the view
of so-called "regulation skeptics" who argue that Internet disputes are difficult or
impossible to regulate); David R. Johnson & David Post, Law and Borders-The Rise of
Law in Cyberspace, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1367, 1400-01 (1996) (arguing that cyberspace
requires an entirely new set of regulatory rules distinct from those that apply to
physical space); see also Peter P. Swire, Of Elephants, Mice, and Privacy. International Choice
of Law and the Internet, 32 INT'L LAW. 991, 1019-23 (1998) (arguing that regulatory
arbitrage will play out differently for big and small players).
44. Jack Goldsmith, The Internet, Conflicts of Regulation, and International Harmonization, in
GOVERNANCE OF GLOBAL NETWORKS IN THE LIGHT OF DIFFERING LOCAL VALUES 197, 200
(Christoph Engel & Kenneth H. Keller eds., 2000) ("[T]he extraterritorial spillover
effects of unilateral national regulation of Internet transactions are both inevitable and
legitimate.").
45. Goldsmith, Against Cyberanarchy, supra note 26, at 1208.
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The Article proceeds in five parts. Part I outlines the scope of the problem,
one in which state laws and company policies conflict, international
cooperation is effectively broken, and states have incentives to take drastic
measures to get access to data needed to enforce the law. Part II then shows that
although this problem is consequential, it is not without precedent; data can be
easily analogized to physical goods-and a large number of courts have
suggested in insurance claims that data is a physical good-as well as intangible
assets such as money and debts. Drawing from these precedents, Part III
identifies the relevant bases upon which a state might legitimately assert
jurisdiction over cloud data, and Part IV looks for lessons drawn from similar
cases regarding transnational conflicts of laws. Finally, Part V applies these
lessons to a number of pending legal issues, including, most importantly, ECPA
reform.
I. The Problem
There is an enormous amount of personal data stored in the global cloud,
and there are times when governments have a legitimate interest in accessing
that data. But for various reasons-competing claims of jurisdiction, blocking
statutes, company policies, and more-governments often find that they are
unable to lawfully access cloud-stored data, especially when the data is
managed by a foreign company or stored on foreign servers. This has a number
of undesirable consequences, including incentivizing governments to pursue
that data by covert means, demanding that all Internet companies store data in-
country, and more.4 Paradoxically, existing barriers to legitimate government
access to online data-barriers that are celebrated by electronic privacy
advocates-have contributed to the further erosion of online privacy by
encouraging states to seek the data by other means.
A. Evidence in the Global Cloud
As the Supreme Court noted in 2014, a growing number of people store
their most sensitive personal data in the cloud.47 Indeed, one of the greatest
societal and technological shifts in recent years has been the move from storing
data and software on a local machine-such as a cell phone or computer-to
storing that data remotely on faraway servers, which can be accessed by a
46. ANDREW K. WOODS, GLOB. NETWORK INITIATIVE, DATA BEYOND BORDERS: MUTUAL
LEGAL ASSISTANCE IN THE INTERNET AGE 3-4 (2015).
47. See Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2489-91 (2014) (noting that the privacy aspects of
the case dwarf those of earlier cases because of the highly personal information stored
digitally, both on cell phones and in the cloud).
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network such as the Internet.48 The evolution of e-mail services provides a nice
example of this trend. When e-mail was first introduced, users stored their
messages locally, on their computers.49 If a user sent an e-mail, she retained a
copy on her machine and the recipient retained a copy on his machine.5 0 The
data existed in two locations, known to both users; intermediaries may have
stored the emails briefly, but the user was responsible for storing and
maintaining the inbox, much like physical mail.5 ' This is no longer the way e-
mail works for many people. The inbox is now managed by a third party that
stores the e-mails on its own servers rather than on the user's computer, and
users access these remotely stored inboxes whenever they need them, using a
series of different tools-websites, applications, and so on.5 2 E-mail has largely
shifted from being a local service to being a cloud-based service. The same shift
has occurred in many other aspects of digital life: photos, movies, music, online
banking, and much more.
53
It is hard to quantify this shift, but it has been enormous. One estimate
suggests that while 7% of all electronic data was stored in the cloud in 2011, that
48. See, e.g., JANNA QUITNEY ANDERSON & LEE RAINIE, PEw RESEARCH CTR., THE FUTURE
OF CLOUD COMPUTING 2 (2010), http://www.pewinternet.org/files/old-media//Files
/Reports/2010/PIPFuture-oftheInternet-cloud-computing.pdf ("A solid majority
of technology experts and stakeholders participating in the fourth Future of the
Internet survey expect that by 2020 most people will access software applications
online and share and access information through the use of remote server networks,
rather than depending primarily on tools and information housed on their individual,
personal computers.").
49. Indeed, the early technical protocols for e-mail were built around the concept of locally
stored e-mail. The Post Office Protocol (POP) is designed for users to pull e-mails down
to their local machines, rather than store them remotely on the server. See J.K.
Reynolds, Post Office Protocol 1-2 (Internet Eng'g Task Force (IETF) Network Working
Grp. Request for Comments (RFC) No. 918, 1984), https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc9l8
(describing how the client requests mail from the server, which is delivered to the local
machine and removed from the server). Today, the technical standard used by the most
popular services is Internet Message Access Protocol (IMAP), which calls for remotely
stored e-mails. See M. Crispin, Internet Message Access Protocol-Version 4, at i (IETF
Network Working Grp. RFC No. 1730, 1994), https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfcl730
(stating IMAP "allows a client to access and manipulate electronic mail messages on a
server").
50. Eric Z. Goodnight, EmaiL What's the Difference Between POP3, IMAP, and Exchange?,




53. See, e.g., Harry McCracken, Four Ways to Put Your Stuff in the Cloud, TIME (July 14,
2011), http://ti.me/SHDqZO (describing how to move towards remote storage for
photos, videos, music, and more).
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number is projected to be 36% by the end of 2016.54 According to another
estimate, 55% of the consumer Internet population will use personal cloud
storage by 2019, and 86% percent of data processing will happen remotely-in
cloud data centers-rather than locally.55 And because many of us now store
much of our personal data online, using services provided by companies from
different countries, our data is spread around the world.56 There has been, in
other words, an "internationalization" of personal data.
57
This is especially true for Internet users located outside the United States,
given that the largest global technology companies are currently U.S.-based.
For example, U.S. firms run 9 out of the 10 most popular websites in India,58 7
out of 10 in Brazil,59 9 out of 10 in the United Kingdom,6° and 7 out of 10 in
Germany.61 A few years ago, one might have attempted to explain this fact by
arguing that only a small sliver of these countries' populations use the Internet,
a cosmopolitan elite that primarily accesses American sites, but today the
reality is far different: the Internet has simply become globalized.62 As of
November 30, 2015, the United States accounted for less than nine percent of
the world's Internet users, which are estimated to number over three billion
people.63 Moreover, as the rest of the world comes online, the United States'
54. Kaamil Nakhasi, Almost 506 of World Data to Be on the Cloud-Gartner, CLOUDTWEAKS
(July 10, 2012), http://cloudtweaks.com/2012/07/50-percent-of-world-data-to-be-on
-the-cloud-gartner.
55. Cisco, Cisco GLOBAL CLOUD INDEX: FORECAST AND METHODOLOGY, 2014-2019, at 1-2
(2015), http://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/solutions/collateral/service-provider/global
-cloud-index-gci/CloudIndexWhitePaper.pdf.
56. See Kerr, supra note 15, at 287-88 (describing the global spread of information as the
Internet spreads).
57. WOODS, supra note 46, at 2 (quoting industry analyst).
58. See Top Sites in India, ALEXA, http://www.alexa.com/topsites/countries/N (last visited
Apr. 4, 2016).
59. See Top Sites in Brazil, ALEXA, http://www.alexa.com/topsites/countries/BR (last
visited Apr. 4, 2016).
60. See Top Sites in United Kingdom, ALEXA, http://www.alexa.com/topsites/countries/GB
(last visited Apr. 4, 2016).
61. See Top Sites in Germany, ALEXA, http://www.alexa.com/topsites/countries/DE (last
visited Apr. 4, 2016).
62. Kerr, supra note 15, at 287 ("The last twenty years have witnessed a dramatic
globalization of the Internet.").
63. See North America Internet Usage Statistics, Population and Telecommunications Reports,
INTERNET WORLD STATS, http://www.internetworldstats.com/statsl4.htm (last
updated Feb. 15, 2016) (estimating that 280,742,532 of the world's 3,366,261,156 Internet
users, or 8.3%, were based in the United States as of November 30,2015).
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share of Internet users is in decline.64 This helps to explain why Internet
companies see expansion into foreign markets as a top priority.
65
The combination of the rise of cloud computing and the globalization of
the Internet means that a person and his data are now often separated by great
distances and possibly several jurisdictions.66 This has practical and legal
consequences. As a practical matter, it has obvious security implications. One
estimate suggests that fifty percent of adult Americans had their data
compromised in a single year, spanning 2013 to 2014-not because their
computers were compromised, but because they wittingly or unwittingly
stored data in a cloud service that was hacked.67 As a jurisdictional matter,
resolving these security breaches is complicated by the fact that people and
their data may be in different jurisdictions, or in multiple jurisdictions, which
means that the government with the most regulatory power over their data
may not be the user's own.
68
Just as this data has become precious to citizens, it has become
indispensable to governments. Governments seek lawful access to Internet data
for a host of reasons, including counterterrorism operations, immigration
control, and many other administrative matters.69 Data is crucial to many law
enforcement investigations, and not only as a supplement o physical evidence.
As people live more of their lives online, the evidence sought by law
64. Orin Kerr cites the figure as 9.6% as of December 2013, less than two years prior to the
November 2015 statistics. Kerr, supra note 15, at 287 & n.7.
65. See Evelyn M. Rusli, Tech Companies Struggle to Get World on Internet, WALL ST. J.
(Apr. 21, 2015,11:54 AM ET), http://on.wsj.com/ mqmYzI.
66. See Bruce Schneier, Programme Dir., Int'l Diplomatic Acad., Cloudy Jurisdiction:
Addressing the Thirst for Cloud Data in Domestic Processes, Remarks at the Seventh
Annual Internet Governance Forum (Nov. 7, 2012) ("[O]ur data is moving to the
cloud[,] ... [p]erhaps held by a third party, perhaps held in a different country .... ).
67. Jose Pagliery, Half of American Adults Hacked This Year, CNN MONEY (May 28, 2014,9:25
AM ET), http://cnnmon.ie/lwkryAp (attributing the vulnerability of so much
personal data to the fact that it is stored online).
68. For example, the European Court of Justice recently invalidated a safe harbor
agreement hat had enabled U.S. firms operating in Europe to transfer customer data
back to the United States for storage and analysis, and the court's analysis turned in
part on the claim that European governments could not guarantee that the data would
be safe from intrusion if it was stored in the United States. Case C-362/14, Schrems v.
Data Prot. Comm'r, 2015 E.C.R., http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf
?text=&docid= 169195&doclang=en.
69. See, e.g., SEC'Y OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEP'T, DRAFT INVESTIGATORY POWERS BILL
(2015), https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment-data
/file/473770/DraftInvestigatoryPowersBill.pdf (detailing a bill that would, if
adopted, grant the U.K. government the authority to seek Internet data in a wide range
of scenarios beyond criminal law enforcement).
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enforcement is often available exclusively online.70 Twenty years ago, a
kidnapper might have confessed to a crime by writing in his diary. The police,
with cause and a warrant, might search the suspect's apartment for that
admission. Today, the same admission is just as likely to be stored online, far
from the reach of the police. Instead of seeking access to the suspect's
apartment, the police would seek access to his e-mail account, which may or
may not be managed within their jurisdiction. Increasingly, the evidence that
law enforcement officers seek is stored on servers controlled by a foreign
company, and that company would assert that the data is in another
jurisdiction.7 1 Suppose, for example, that a British user creates an e-mail
account with Google, and his data is stored in California.72 Suppose further
that this British user runs into trouble with the law for not having paid his
taxes. The state might effect a seizure of his assets and a search of his
apartment. If the police thought that his cloud-based data was relevant to their
investigation, they might approach Google to ask for the location data and
time of his last login, the contents of his e-mails, the e-mail address associated
with his name, and more. Google would probably refuse to hand over most of
that data-including the stored contents of his online files and e-mails-on the
grounds that the only state with the authority to compel it is the United States.
This problem is not limited to a small number of exotic cases. In 2014
alone, the British government sought customer data for at least 53,947 separate
user accounts controlled by American technology companies.7 3 Collectively,
70. See Orin S. Kerr, Digital Evidence and the New Criminal Procedure, 105 COLuM. L. REv. 279,
279-80, 307 (2005).
71. This is because the vast majority of the world's most popular e-mail and cloud storage
platforms are American, and many of those providers assume that the data they store
is, for jurisdictional purposes, held in the United States. This is the view of Google and
Facebook, for example. See supra note 29.
72. Or the data may be moved around and stored in a number of different places, as Google
deems fit. See, e.g., Transcript of July 31, 2014 Hearing at 20, Microsoft E-mail Search
Warrant Case, 15 F. Supp. 3d 466 (S.D.N.Y 2014), appeal docketed sub nom. Microsoft
Corp. v. United States, No. 14-2985-cv (2d Cir. argued Sept. 9, 2015) (No. 13 Mag. 2814)
("[T]oday with cloud services, it has been increasingly common for location of data to
change from day to day, hour to hour.").
73. These statistics are not comprehensive; they represent simply the number of requests
made to six major Internet companies: Apple, Facebook, Google, Microsoft, Twitter,
and Yahoo!. These transparency reports can be found on the public websites of
each company. See Apple, Report on Government Information Requests: January 1-
June 30, 2014, http://www.apple.com/legal/privacy/transparency/requests-20140630
-en.pdf (last visited Apr. 4, 2016); Apple, Report on Government Information Requests:
July 1-December 31, 2014, http://www.apple.com/legal/privacy/transparency
/requests-20141231-en.pdf (last visited Apr. 4, 2016); Microsoft, Law Enforcement
Requests Report 2014: January-June, 2014, http://www.microsoft.com/about
/corporatecitizenship/en-us/transparencyhub/lerr (last visited Apr. 4, 2016) (to locate,
select "2014 Hl Report" under "Download report"); Microsoft, Law Enforcement
Requests Report 2014: July-December, 2014, http://www.microsoft.com
footnote continued on next page
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six technology companies-Apple, Facebook, Google, Microsoft, Twitter, and
Yahoo!-fielded 22,103 separate requests from the United Kingdom for
customer data. On average, those requests led to some data being handed over
to the British government in roughly sixty-seven percent of cases.
74
Table 1
2014 U.K. Government Requests for
Internet Data from Major U.S. Service Providers
Percentage ofNumber of Users cnaeo
Internet Number of Cases in Which
or Devices
Service Provider Requests for Data Affd Some Data Was
AffectedRevealed
Apple (Jan.-June) 1180 19,057 51%
Apple (July-Dec.) 1052 4171 54%
Facebook (Jan.-June) 2110 2619 72%
Facebook (July-Dec.) 2366 2890 75%
Google (Jan.-June) 1535 1991 72%
Google (July-Dec.) 2080 2755 75%
Microsoft (Jan.-June) 4090 7562 78%
Microsoft (July-Dec.) 4518 8034 75%
/about/corporatecitizenship/en-us/transparencyhub/lerr (last visited Apr. 4, 2016) (to
locate, select "2014 H2 Report" under "Download report"); Yahoo!, Transparency
Report: Government Data Requests: January 1, 2014-June 30, 2014,
https://transparency.yahoo.com/government-data-requests/index.htm (last visited
Apr. 4, 2016) (to locate, select "January 1, 2014-June 30, 2014" under "Requests by
Country"); Yahoo!, Transparency Report: Government Data Requests: July 1, 2014-
December 31, 2014, https://transparency.yahoo.com/government-data-requests/index
.htm (last visited Apr. 4, 2016) (to locate, select "July 1, 2014-December 31, 2014" under
"Requests by Country"); Countries-Google Transparency Report January to June 2014,
GOOGLE, http://www.google.com/transparencyreport/userdatarequests/countries/?p
=2014-06 (last visited Apr. 4, 2016); Countries-Google Transparency Report July to
December 2014, GOOGLE, http://www.google.com/transparencyreport/userdatarequests
/countries/?p=2014-12 (last visited Apr. 4, 2016); United Kingdom Requests for Data:
January 2014-June 2014, FACEBOOK, https://govtrequests.facebook.com/country/United
%20Kingdom/2014-H1 (last visited Apr. 4, 2016); United Kingdom Requests for Data:L July
2014-December 2014, FACEBOOK, https://govtrequests.facebook.com/country/United
%20Kingdom/2014-H2 (last visited Apr. 4, 2016); Information Requests (Government):
January 1-June 30, 2014, TWITTER, https://transparency.twitter.com/information
-requests/2014/jan-jun (last visited Apr. 4, 2016); Information Requests (Government):
July 1-December 31, 2014, TWITTER, https://transparency.twitter.com/information
-requests/2014/jul-dec (last visited Apr. 4, 2016).
74. See sources cited supra note 73.
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Number of Users Percentage of
Internet Number of N r ofvUss Cases in Whichor Devices SoeDtWa
Service Provider Requests for Data Affected Some Data Was
Revealed
Twitter (Jan.-June) 78 220 46%
Twitter (July-Dec.) 116 371 34%
Yahoo! (Jan.-June) 1408 2037 47%
Yahoo! (July-Dec.) 1570 2240 30%
Total: 22,103 53,947 59%
It appears that only a tiny percentage of those cases-no more than a few
percentage points-yielded stored contents like e-mails and other documents.
7 5
When U.S. technology firms hand over data to foreign governments, the data
is almost entirely limited to metadata or basic subscriber information; non-U.S.
law enforcement agents rarely obtain access to stored contents like e-mails and
photographs, for the reasons described below.7 6 This is striking: a police officer
now must cross an international border in order to do her job, whereas twenty
or even ten years ago, the same officer might have been able to investigate a
routine crime like kidnapping without leaving her country. Just as crime has
become increasingly global, evidence gathering has followed suit.77 And yet, in
order to obtain access to this crucial data, the law enforcement agent faces a
seeming quagmire of unresolved jurisdictional puzzles.
B. Jurisdictional Confusion
Suppose that a woman has just been murdered in New Delhi, India. Her
boyfriend, who had previously threatened to hurt her, is the primary suspect.
The police get a warrant from a judge to search his apartment, but the only
things in the apartment are a laptop computer cord and a phone charger; the
laptop and phone are gone. Knowing that the suspect regularly uses a Gmail
account, the police contact Google to get access to the account. But Google
refuses to hand over the relevant data. As a company domiciled in the United
States, Google must comply with ECPA, which prohibits the firm from
releasing any stored communications (like e-mails) without a warrant from a
75. This data is available only from Apple, Microsoft, and Yahoo!. See sources cited supra
note 73.
76. See infra Part I.B.
77. The trend of internationalization of law enforcement has been progressing for some
time now. See, e.g., PETER ANDREAS & ETHAN NADELMANN, POLICING THE GLOBE:
CRIMINALIZATION AND CRIME CONTROL IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (2006) (describing
the trend of international cooperation in law enforcement efforts).
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U.S. judge.7 8 Importantly, Google contends that this statutory prohibition
applies regardless of where the user data is stored.79 However, ECPA does allow
a U.S. data controller to release transactional data, such as login times,
locations, and basic subscriber information, to foreign governments.80 Google
may therefore hand over this data if the request meets their internal
guidelines.
81
The result is an odd jurisdictional conflict. This case otherwise appears to
be an entirely Indian matter-an Indian police officer investigating an Indian
crime she suspects to have been committed by one Indian citizen against
another, on Indian soil. Yet the Indian law enforcement agent must ask an
American judge to sign off on her request to receive access to the data, despite
the fact that an Indian magistrate has already deemed the data crucial to the
investigation. Not only does this seem unfair, it has a number of unwanted
consequences, as we will see in a moment.
Part of the problem is disagreement between major Internet companies
about the right test for determining where data is located and whether a state's
jurisdiction extends far enough to reach that data. Google and Facebook
suggest that the relevant locus is the company's domicile; since they are
headquartered in the United States, they argue in a number of different
contexts that only the U.S. government can compel stored data content,
regardless of where it is used.82 This means that a British or Indian or Brazilian
law enforcement official must request help from the United States to get
evidence critical to enforcing her country's domestic laws when that data is
stored by Google, even if the data is on a server outside the United States.
78. See 18 U.S.C. § 2703 (2014).
79. See Transparency Report Legal Process, GOOGLE, http://www.google.com
/transparencyreport/userdatarequests/legalprocess (la t visited Apr. 4, 2016) (noting
implicitly that Google responds to U.S. law enforcement requests for data regardless of
the location of the server where the data is stored). Microsoft takes a different view. See
Microsoft's Objections, supra note 4, at 1 (arguing that U.S. law enforcement can
compel only data stored on servers in the United States, not data stored on servers
abroad).
80. See 18 U.S.C. § 2701(c). ECPA also provides for a number of exceptions, one of which
allows for voluntary disclosure of stored communications to governments without a
warrant in the case of extreme emergencies. Id. § 2702(b)(8) (noting that an Internet
service provider may divulge the contents of communications "to a governmental
entity, if the provider, in good faith, believes that an emergency involving danger of
death or serious physical injury to any person requires disclosure without delay of
communications relating to the emergency").
81. Transparency Report, supra note 79 ("On a voluntary basis, we may provide user data in
response to valid legal process from non-U.S. government agencies, if those requests
are consistent with international norms, U.S. law, Google's policies and the law of the
requesting country.").
82. See supra note 29 (summarizing Google and Facebook's view that they believe the
relevant locus is the headquarters of the company, not the location of the data).
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Microsoft, by contrast, asserts that the relevant locus ought to be the physical
location of the data.83 So if the data is resting in Redmond, Washington, when
police seek access to it-whether American police or foreign police-they
would need a legal instrument from a U.S. judge. If the data sits in an Irish data
center, however, the Irish government may have the authority to access it
while the U.S. government may not.
The Second Circuit may decide which of these tests prevails with regard to
the Stored Communications Act.84 But that will only answer the question of
how far one law can reach to regulate U.S. companies. It will not solve the
question of how to locate a Bitcoin account if the IRS seeks to levy it in a tax
collection proceeding, for example. Nor will it resolve how a U.K. judge should
decide where the data is located when a British citizen in London uploads data
to the cloud, to be stored on servers controlled by a foreign company. Indeed,
the far more challenging scenario-and far more common for foreign law
enforcement-is when a government seeks data controlled by a foreign
company, and the company disagrees with the government about who has
jurisdiction to compel the data. To see how this might work from the
perspective of the United States, imagine that the United States seeks data
controlled by Viber, a Japanese online communication service with 711 million
registered accounts.85 If U.S. law enforcement agents sought data in connection
with a crime that occurred in the United States, the data for which happened to
be in Japan, would they have to ask Japan for the data? Or would they be able to
compel it regardless of its location? Suppose that Viber had offices in the
United States, and the U.S. government ook the position that it could seize the
office funds in order to compel Viber to hand over the data. How should a
judge rule in this case?
83. See Brief for Appellant, supra note 28, at 26-27, 31-32 (concluding that the court's order
would be an extraterritorial application of ECPA because the search in question would
occur in Ireland, where the data is stored, suggesting that the relevant territorial
question for determining ECPA's reach is where the data is stored, not where the
company is domiciled).
84. See Microsoft Corp. v. United States, No. 14-2985-cv (2d Cir. argued Sept. 9,2015).
85. By the end of 2015, Viber had 711 million unique customer IDs, a huge increase from
the 495 million IDs reported the prior year. See Rakuten, Inc., FY2015 Fourth Quarter
and Full Year Consolidated Financial Results, PowerPoint Presentation 70 (Feb. 12,
2016), http://global.rakuten.com/corp/investors/documents/results. Viber is owned
by Rakuten, a Japanese company, but it is based in Israel and Cyprus. Chang-Ran Kim,
Japan's Rakuten Buys Chat App Viber for $900 Million to Expand Digital Empire,
REUTERS (Feb. 14, 2014, 5:10 AM EST), http://reut.rs/ljDKKEN. It is not immediately
clear where Viber stores its data; the servers could be located in any of these
countries, or somewhere else. Another example is Yandex, a Russian website that is
fourth-largest search engine in the world and a major Internet company in Russia.
Perfect 10, Inc. v. Yandex N.V., 962 F. Supp. 2d 1146, 1150 (N.D. Cal. 2013); see YANDEX,
https://www.yandex.com (last visited Apr. 4, 2016). Yandex stores much of its data in
Russia. See Perfect 10, 962 F. Supp. 2d at 1150-51.
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There is very little precedent for such cases of cross-border government
requests for data, which are soon to be commonplace. Note that this
determination of when governments have jurisdiction over extraterritorial
data-which the remainder of this Article is devoted to addressing-is not
solely a matter of enforcement.86 The largest American Internet companies,
like Google and Facebook, have offices, staff, and other assets in foreign
countries. In those cases, the question is not whether the foreign government
has personal jurisdiction over the technology firm; clearly it does. Rather, the
questions are: When would it be appropriate to exert that jurisdiction in order
to obtain access to customer data, wherever it is held, and how should a court
adjudicate a claim if another state asserts conflicting jurisdiction over the same
data? Given all of this jurisdictional uncertainty, many countries find
themselves asking for help from whatever government has clear authority to
compel the data-typically the United States, since the world's largest Internet
companies are headquartered there. Here, too, there are serious problems.
C. A Broken International System
Because it can often be hard to determine who has jurisdiction over data,
and because companies and states take drastically different views about the
proper scope of state jurisdiction over data, states often find that they must ask
another state for help to get the data they seek. This can happen through a
number of different channels. Letters rogatory-letters judicially issued across
state lines requesting evidence held in another jurisdiction-are one such
mechanism. But these are rarely used and extremely unreliable.87 The more
common mechanism for international cooperation regarding cloud-stored data
is for one state to request mutual legal assistance from another state, a process
that is guided by so-called mutual legal assistance treaties (MLATs).8 8 There are
hundreds of bilateral MLATs and a number of multilateral MLATs as well,
such as the E.U.-U.S. agreement.8 9 When one country requests mutual legal
86. Jurisdiction is classically divided into three categories: jurisdiction to adjudicate,
jurisdiction to prescribe, and jurisdiction to enforce. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE
FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 401 (AM. LAW INST. 1987).
87. T. MARKUS FUNK, FED. JUDICIAL CT1., MUTUAL LEGAL ASSISTANCE TREATIES AND
LETTERS ROGATORY: A GUIDE FOR JUDGES 3 (2014), http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf
/lookup/mlat-lr-guide-funk-fjc-2014.pdf/$file/mlat-lr-guide-funk-fjc-2014.pdf ("The
process for letters rogatory is more time-consuming and unpredictable than that for
MLATs. This is in large part because the enforcement of letters rogatory is a matter of
comity between courts, rather than treaty-based. For these reasons, prosecutors
typically consider letters rogatory an option of last resort for accessing evidence
abroad, to be exercised only when MLATs are not available.").
88. See WOODS, supra note 46, at 3.
89. See MLAT Index, MLAT.INFO, https://mlat.info/mlat-index (last visited Apr. 4, 2016)
(listing bilateral and multilateral MLATs).
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assistance, it can take an extremely long time to complete the request-a result
of the complicated nature of the process.
90
In a typical case, law enforcement officials in a requesting state must
translate their request into another language, submit it up their chain of
command, and pass it along to a diplomat with the authority to communicate
that request to the receiving country's central authority-which, because so
many of the world's leading technology companies are based in the United
States, is very often the U.S. Department of Justice's (DOJ) Office of
International Affairs (OIA).9 1 The OIA handles all requests of this sort and
prepares the required paperwork for an MLAT request before passing it on to
the U.S. Attorney in the jurisdiction of the company that controls the data.
92
The U.S. Attorney will review the submission and request a warrant under 28
U.S.C. § 1782 from a judge, who will then review the request to determine that
it meets the Fourth Amendment standard of probable cause.93 The FBI then
takes the warrant to the data controller-typically an Internet company or
nonprofit storing the data-and the data controller reviews the warrant. If the
warrant is sufficient, and the data controller chooses to comply, they pass the
data back through the chain to the requesting country.94 The entire process has
been estimated to take an average of ten months, and in some cases can take
much longer.
95
90. See WOODS, supra note 46, at 3.
91. See Kate Westmoreland, Process for Obtaining User Data from California Under a
Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty (MLAT) 1 (n.d.), http://cyberlaw.stanford.edu/files
/blogs/MLAT%20flowchart%20-%2012.19.14.pdf.
92. See FUNK, supra note 87, at 3, 6, 10.
93. See id. at 6, 8, 10.
94. See Westmoreland, supra note 91, at 1.
95. PRESIDENT'S REVIEW GRP. ON INTELLIGENCE & COMMC'NS TECHS., LIBERTY AND
SECURITY IN A CHANGING WORLD: REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS 227 (2013),
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/2013-12-12-rg-final-report.pdf.
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As the number of requests has skyrocketed, the DOJ has been unable to
keep up.97 The President's Review Group has recommended increased funding
for the OIA specifically to handle MLAT requests,98 and the OIA itself has
asked for more funding.99 But whether Congress will approve the funding
remains to be seen.100 Moreover, the number of requests has increased
exponentially with the global spread of the Internet, and the OIA has been
unable to meet the demand.10 1 As the DOJ put it in its fiscal year 2017 request
for funding from Congress: "Since FY 2000, the number of requests for
assistance from foreign authorities handled by OIA has increased nearly 85%,
and the number of requests for computer records has increased over 1,000%."102
These trends do not appear to be slowing down. In fiscal year 2014, the OIA
96. U.S. Dep't of Justice, Foreign MLAT Request Data (on file with author).
97. WOODS, supra note 46, at 10.
98. PRESIDENT'S REVIEW GRP. ON INTELLIGENCE & COMMC'NS TECHS., supra note 95, at 226-
28.
99. U.S. Dep't of Justice, FY 2015 Budget Request: Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty Process
Reform, http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/jmd/legacy/2014/07/13/mut-legal
-assist.pdf (last visited Apr. 4, 2016).
100. See Peter Swire & Justin D. Hemmings, Re-Engineering the Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty
Process, 71 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. (forthcoming 2016) (manuscript at 26).
101. CRIMINAL DIV., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, PERFORMANCE BUDGET: FY 2017 PRESIDENT'S
BUDGET 23 (2016), http://www.justice.gov/jmd/file/820926/download.
102. Id. at 24.
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handled 3270 MLAT requests from foreign governments, and nearly 1200 of
those requests were for computer records.10 3 In the fiscal year 2015, the OIA
handled roughly the same number of MLAT requests from foreign
governments as the prior year (3352 versus 3270), but the number of foreign
requests for computer records nearly doubled over the prior year (2183 versus
1160).104 The OIA's resources have not increased to meet this new demand, and
as a result a growing number of MLAT requests go unanswered: the current
backlog of unanswered foreign requests for assistance-both MLAT requests
and extradition requests-has grown to over 12,000.105 These numbers, though
alarming, do not reflect the true scale of foreign government interest in data
controlled by U.S. companies, however; because the MLAT process is so slow,
many law enforcement agents never even bother to file MLAT requests.
10 6
D. Government Response
Because the data that states seek may be under another jurisdiction's
control and international cooperation is so cumbersome, law enforcement
officers may sometimes resort to other, less wholesome tactics to get access to
the data. These tactics range from demanding that data be stored locally-a
hugely costly requirement-to raiding the company offices, to engaging in
surveillance. Each of these actions has costs-from raising the cost of doing
business on the Internet to threatening Internet users' privacy.10 7 Mitigating
these harms is one of the best motivations for resolving jurisdictional conflicts
over Internet data and devising a more efficient regime for sharing cloud-based
evidence across borders. 
108
As noted, because some companies and countries have decided that the
location of the data is determinative of jurisdiction, a number of states have
moved to require that Internet companies store all relevant data locally. For
example, Brazil considered passing a bill that would give the executive branch
the power to force Internet companies "to install or use structures for storage,
103. CRIMINAL Div., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, FY 2016 PRESIDENT'S BUDGET 23 (2015),
https://edit.justice.gov/sites/default/files/jmd/pages/attachments/2015/02/02/10
._criminal-division-crm.pdf; E-mail from Ian Musa, Bus. Process Manager, Office of
Int'l Affairs, U.S. Dep't of Justice, to author (Feb. 19, 2016) (on file with author).
104. CRIMINAL Div., supra note 101, at 24.
105. Id. at 25.
106. Skype Interview with Anonymous Officer, United Nations Office on Drugs & Crime
(Sept. 8, 2014).
107. See Matthias Bauer et al., The Costs of Data Localisation: Friendly Fire on Economic Recovery
2 (Eur. Ctr. for Int'l Political Econ., Occasional Paper No. 3, 2014), http://www.ecipe.org
/app/uploads/2014/12/OCC32014__l.pdf (attempting to quantify the costs of data
localization requirements and related privacy laws).
108. The Article turns to the more practical aspects of these reforms in Part V below.
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management and dissemination of data in the country."10 9 Russia went further,
passing a localization law that it is now enforcing.110 Data localization has been
described as a threat that might "break" the Internet.u lI This is somewhat of an
exaggeration: the Internet has long appeared different in different countries,
reflecting each state's considerable and enduring power to regulate electronic
content within its borders; this is unlikely to stop any time soon.1 2 But data
localization measures can nonetheless impose a number of considerable costs.
First, perhaps most obviously, localization requirements create significant
efficiency costs."3 The very point of a distributed network is to be able to store
and move data through the network-including data load balancing-in ways
that maximize efficiency14 If an Internet user flies from New York to
Sao Paolo and accesses the same Internet services in both cities, it may make
sense for her Internet companies to cache some of her data in servers closer to
Sao Paolo than New York. But it may not. What if she is in Brazil for two
days-should the service provider be forced to port all of her data into the
country just because she accessed the service while on vacation there? It would
109. Lei No. 12.965, de 23 de Abril de 2014, DIARIO OFICIAL DA UNIAO [D.O.U.] de 24.4.2014
(Braz.), translated in Macro Civil Brazilian Internet Bill of Rightv English Translation, ASS'N
FOR PROGRESSIVE COMM., https://www.apc.org/en/blog/marco-civil-brazilian-internet
-bill-rights-english (last visited Apr. 4, 2016); see also Arthur Rodrigues do Amaral et al.,
Marco Civil da Internet Brazil's New Internet Law Could Broadly Impact Online Companies'
Privacy and Data Handling Practices, HOGAN LOVELLS (May 5, 2014), http://www
.hoganlovells.com/marco-civil-da-internet-brazils-new-internet-law-could-broadly
-impact-online-companies-privacy-and-data-handling-practices-05-05-2014 (describing
the possible effects of Brazil's localization bill on global Internet companies).
110. See Sergei Blagov, Russia to Twitter Comply with Data Localization, BLOOMBERG BNA
(Jan. 25, 2016), http://www.bna.com/russia-twitter-comply-n57982066518 (describing
Russia's demands that Twitter store data collected about Russian citizens locally on
Russian soil in accordance with the recently passed data localization law).
111. Anupam Chander & Uy n P. Le, Data Nationalism, 64 EMORY L.J. 677, 713 (2015)
(describing data localization bills as efforts that "break the World Wide Web").
112. See GOLDSMITH & WU, supra note 26, at 180-81 (describing how states have significant
control over the Internet's appearance and behavior within a particular country,
contrary to the predictions of a number of scholars that the Internet would behave as a
transnational space beyond state control).
113. Cf Ned Schultheis, Note, Warrants in the Cloudv How Extraterritorial Application of the
Stored Communications Act Threatens the United States' Cloud Storage Industry, 9 BROOK. J.
CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 661, 663 (2015) (describing how "Microsoft and other U.S. cloud
companies risk losing large sums of business to either foreign data storage companies
or data localization movements" as a result of the SCA's unclear requirements).
114. See Elastic Load Balancing, AMAZON WEB SERVS., http://aws.amazon.com
/elasticloadbalancing (last visited Apr. 4, 2016) (describing load balancing services as a
way to distribute data in order to accommodate numerous requests for that data, so that
each request is handled promptly).
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certainly be a drag on the service's efficiency if every bit of data created by that
user had to be stored wherever the service was accessible.
115
Second, localization requirements impose considerable monetary costs on
Internet companies, leading to increased user fees or reduced services.116 Many
Internet companies offer users a staggering array of no-fee services-things
like e-mail, photo storage, and online banking. Many of these things are not
free, of course-they are paid for with advertisements. But if the service costs
go up for Internet companies, as they would under localization requirements,
advertising costs would likely go up as well, possibly to the point where
advertising will no longer pay for the free services.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, data localization rules have
significant implications for privacy. In states where data localization is
mandated, it is considerably easier for states to surveil their citizens.
117
Moreover, data localization is unlikely to limit the U.S. National Security
Agency's (NSA) ability to surveil Internet traffic; if anything, gathering all of a
country's data in one place-and off U.S. soil-may make it easier for the NSA
to surveil.
118
Another tactic that states use to get the data that they cannot get through
lawful channels, such as MLAT, is to bully or threaten companies to coerce
them into handing over the data. For example, South Korean officials raided
Google's offices in Seoul and seized digital evidence after it was alleged that
Google had inappropriately collected users' data.119 These sorts of tactics are
often hard to document because, while some employee arrests and office raids
make the headlines, law enforcement officers far more often use subtler means
of intimidating Internet companies into cooperating with their requests for
data.
120
Yet another tactic deployed by states when they cannot get data with the
company's assistance is covert surveillance.121 This is problematic for obvious
115. See Bauer et al., supra note 107, at 3.
116. SeeChander & L, supra note 111, at 721.
117. See id. at 735-38.
118. See id. at 714-18.
119. Song Jung-a, South Korean Police Raid Google Offices, FIN. TIMEs (Aug. 10, 2010, 5:53 PM),
http://on.ft.com/lMmoRcs.
120. See Andrew K. Woods, Why Does Microsoft Want a Global Convention on Government
Access to Data?, JUST SECURITY (Feb. 19, 2014, 9:45 AM), https://www.justsecurity.org
/7246/microsoft-global-convention-government-access-data.
121. Cf Richard Salgado, Dir. Law Enf't & Info. Sec., Google Inc., Is the Internet Starting
to Fracture?, Remarks at Brookings Institution Panel (Sept. 25, 2014), http://www
.brookings.edu/events/2014/09/25-internet-starting-to-fracture (suggesting implicitly
that countries may resort to covert surveillance due to temptation "to try to build their
own surveillance infrastructure to match what they view.., as being the capabilities of
the NSA").
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reasons, and it is beyond the scope of this Article to catalog all of the problems
with Internet surveillance.122 It should be self-evident that a regime in which
government can lawfully access data in the cloud when that data is necessary
for law enforcement is preferable to a regime in which government accesses
the same data through covert surveillance.
The current state of affairs in cross-border data requests is suboptimal
from nearly every perspective. Clearly, from the state's perspective, the
inability to access data that is needed for law enforcement operations is a
problem. From the perspective of Internet companies, being caught in the
middle of two countries' dispute over jurisdiction may make it hard to establish
clear and consistent policies. Finally, from the perspective of the user, the
current regime is problematic because it encourages states to take
extraordinary-and perhaps even illegal-measures to obtain data necessary
for law enforcement. Some may look at the problem described here and ask,
"What's the problem? States have too much access to data as it is-we should
not make it easier for them." But a regime in which law enforcement officials
can get access to digital evidence in which they have a legitimate interest is less
of a threat to privacy than the regime we have now-one in which law
enforcement officials cannot get the data they seek through lawful channels
and, as a result, may resort to other tactics.123 This is an underappreciated
point: regardless of whether one's normative goals are to maximize user
privacy, to maximize law enforcement capabilities, or to maximize the
efficiency of the Internet, the equilibrium point is likely the same. More
privacy can be achieved by giving governments greater lawful access to data in
the cloud when that access is justified. As we will see, that requires a
mechanism for determining under what circumstances governments have
jurisdiction over data stored in the global cloud.
II. Is Data Different?
The growth of cloud-stored data presents a number of jurisdictional
questions, which the next Part will address. But before asking whether data
presents novel jurisdictional questions, it may make sense to ask whether data
itself is conceptually exceptional. This Part attempts to show why claims about
data's unique nature-as a mobile, divisible, location-independent asset-are
largely overstated. Rather, data has analogues in both physical and intangible
122. For a nice overview of the subject, see BRUCE SCHNEIER, DATA AND GOLIATH: THE
HIDDEN BATTLES TO COLLECT YOUR DATA AND CONTROL YOUR WORLD (2015).
123. See Andrew K. Woods, You Should Care About Mutual Legal Assistance More than You Do,
JUST SECURITY (Jan. 28, 2015, 12:13 PM), https://www.justsecurity.org/19449/care
-mutual-legal-assistance.
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assets, both of which provide useful precedents for courts attempting to
determine the scope of law's reach into the cloud.
A. The Claim: "Data Is Different"
Given the radical change that the cloud represents-to the health sector, to
the financial sector, and to everyday life-the claim that the rise of big data
calls for new legal principles has intuitive appeal.124 The digitization of once-
physical experiences like communications and commerce represents a
profound shift in the course of everyday life-a shift that has repercussions for
social norms, the economy, and of course, the law.125 So it is natural to think
that this novel activity calls for novel legal principles.126 This is the data
exceptionalist view, and it turns on a number of claims about cloud-based data.
To be clear, these claims are not solely about the nature of data, but rather
about the role of data in the cloud. For example, the mobility of data is not a
jurisdictional problem unless that data is transmitted in a network that spans
across borders, as the Internet does. If a French person writes in her diary while
she is in France, her diary is in France. If she jots down her thoughts on an iPad
while in France, that digital data is in France and the situation is functionally
the same. The move from a paper diary to a digital one does not raise novel
jurisdictional concerns. However, if the same person backs up her iPad to
iCloud, her thoughts may be stored on servers in another country, and here we
get into potentially novel territory.
Not only can the data be moved around quickly, but it also can be divided
into many different pieces and flung into different jurisdictions. While a paper
letter can be in only one place at one time, a digital letter might be divided up
into many different component parts and distributed around the world, such
that the data can be in more than one place simultaneously, and neither
location needs to be the same as the location of the user.12 7 The argument that
data is unique and cannot be treated as territorial thus stems from the fact that
it is mobile and divisible and commingles with other data.128 Furthermore,
124. See, e.g., Andrews & Newman, supra note 20, at 318 ("As with any disruptive leap
forward in technology that ultimately alters real-space behavior, the move to the cloud
carries with it implications for the administration of legal systems....").
125. See generally 1 MANUEL CASTELLs, THE INFORMATION AGE: ECONOMY, SOCIETY, AND
CULTURE; THE RISE OF THE NETWORK SOCIETY (2d ed. 2000) (describing the Internet's
fundamental influence on nearly every aspect of daily life).
126. See, e.g., David Friedman, Does Technology Require New Law?, 25 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y
71, 72, 85 (2002) (describing how the Internet and related technologies changed many
aspects of life and explaining how some of this new activity will require new
regulations).
127. See Transcript of July 31, 2014 Hearing, supra note 72, at 20.
128. Daskal, supra note 20, at 365-76.
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because data is not tangible, it need not be tied to a particular location, giving
data "location independence" between the user of the data and the location of
the data.129 But as the next subparts will illustrate, none of these features is
entirely novel.
B. The Reality: Data Is Not So Different
Many of the features that are cited as evidence of data's unique properties
are in fact neither novel nor unique to data. Indeed, for as long as global trade
has existed, people have been commingling and moving their assets in and out
of different jurisdictions and courts have managed to adapt their old, territorial
rules to assets that cross territories.130 This Subpart addresses each of the
features of data that could potentially make data uniquely challenging from the
standpoint of a legal regime rooted in territorial notions of jurisdiction.
Because courts can choose to treat data as either an intangible or tangible asset,
the analysis is divided into two categories.
1. Data as an intangible asset
a. Intangibility
One aspect of data that might lead one to believe that old, territorial rules
will not easily apply is its intangible nature: the fact that we cannot hold digital
ones and zeros in our hands. This intangibility, however, is not on its own a
novel problem because courts have adjudicated disputes over intangible assets
like stock and debts for many years.13 1 Indeed, courts have come up with a
129. Id. at 369-70.
130. See, e.g., United States v. First Nat'l City Bank, 396 F.2d 897, 900 (2d Cir. 1968) ("The
basic legal question confronting us is not a total stranger to this Court. With the
growing interdependence of world trade and the increased mobility of persons and
companies, the need arises not infrequently, whether related to civil or criminal
proceedings, for the production of evidence located in foreign jurisdictions.").
131. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 412
cmt. f (AM. LAW INST. 1987) ("Intangible property, regardless of where physical
evidence of ownership may be, is ordinarily considered to be located in a state if the
property consists of: (i) shares of a corporation or comparable juridical entity domiciled
in the state; (ii) debt obligations of the state or subdivision of the state, or of a person
(natural or juridical) resident or domiciled in that state; or (iii) rights created or
protected by the laws of the state, such as patents, copyrights, and trademarks."). It is
true that debt may be written up in a tangible paper instrument, but the physical
location of that instrument does not control the location of the debt. The same is true
for stocks, which are paper manifestations of an equity stake in a company. The paper
stock certificates are not treated as tangible property except where the stock has been
certificated. See Simowitz, supra note 24, at 13 n.36.
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number of different approaches to locating intangible assets.132 For example,
intellectual property rights like trademarks are typically found to be located
wherever they were created or registered.133 Debts are typically located where
the debtor resides134-as that is typically, though not always, where steps can
be taken to ameliorate the debt. As early as the nineteenth century, shares of
stock have been treated like mortgages, bonds, and promissory notes for the
purposes of taxation: both the stock owner's domiciliary state and the issuer's
state of incorporation are legally able to tax capital gains made from the sale of
stock.135 In property claims, corporate shares are typically found to be located
in the state where the corporation was incorporated-not he location of the
piece of paper that grants the holder stock ownership.
136
As the Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States
cautions, "intangible property may have different situs for different purposes,
and none at all for some purposes."137 The appropriate test for a court to apply
when determining the location of data that is sought in connection with a
criminal investigation may very well be different than the appropriate test for
determining location for tax purposes or civil disputes. In fact, in many cases it
will not matter where the intangible asset is located as long as the court has
jurisdiction over a defendant who can command the asset's production.138 But
before turning to the jurisdictional grounds upon which a state might assert its
132. See Simowitz, supra note 24, at 13-20 (describing how courts have deployed a number of
different fictions to give an intangible asset a physical location for jurisdictional
purposes).
133. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 455
reporters' note 2 ("Intangible property rights created or protected by a state, such as
patents, trademarks, and copyrights, are generally considered to have their situs in the
state that created them-regardless of the location of the physical evidence of
ownership.").
134. Id. ("[D]ebt obligations are generally considered located at the domicile or place of
incorporation of the debtor but may have been contractually fixed by the parties at
some other place, such as the head office of a bank or trustee.").
135. See, e.g., Comment, Conflict of Laws Situs of Shares of Corporate Stock for Purposes of
Taxation, 7 CALIF. L. REV. 117, 119 & n.15 (1919) (noting the principle of mobilia
sequuntur personam and citing a number of early cases that support the principle).
136. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 455
reporters' note 2 ("Ordinarily the shares of a corporation (or comparable juridical
entity) are considered to have their situs at the corporation's place of
incorporation....").
137. Id.
138. See, e.g., United States v. Bank of N.S., 740 F.2d 817, 826-28 (1 1th Cir. 1984) (finding that
bank records located abroad could be compelled in the United States, even where doing
so would violate foreign law). Simowitz endorses applying this rule to all intangible
assets. See Simowitz, supra note 24, at 316 (arguing that giving intangible assets a
fictional situs is unhelpful and suggesting instead that courts can seize an asset in order
to enforce a judgment where the court has personal jurisdiction over a party).
Against Data Exceptionalism
68 STAN. L. REV. 729 (2016)
authority over cloud data, it is worth noting that there is a great deal of
similarity between data and intangible assets, and courts have considerable
experience negotiating claims involving those assets-either by giving them a
fictional situs, or by ignoring the situs and granting jurisdiction nonetheless.139
b. Mobility
The data exceptionalists also suggest that jurisdiction based on location
makes little sense when the subject is data because data is so mobile: it is easy to
move data from one location to another at the speed of light.140 But mobility, as
a feature of an asset class, is hardly unique to data. Consider money, which can
be wired from one location to another in an instant. Courts have little trouble
determining the location of money for the purposes of asserting jurisdiction
over the asset. The same is true for nearly everything, given the speed of
modern communications and transportation networks. Courts have no special
difficulty determining jurisdiction over people, goods, or any of the other
highly mobile assets that regularly flow across jurisdictional lines. So data's
mobility cannot be enough on its own to make us worry that territorial
jurisdiction rules will be especially problematic.
14 1
One feature of data that is not shared by debt, money, or other assets is
how easy it is to copy and store in multiple locations at once. But this does not
necessarily change the core of the territoriality analysis. Indeed, courts have
inquired whether the act of moving data is meaningfully different from the act
of moving material information. In an ongoing dispute regarding patent
infringement, the U.S. International Trade Commission (ITC) found that it had
jurisdiction, under section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930,142 over a patent
dispute involving a Texas company that received digital files from a Pakistani
company and then printed them, creating the infringing product.143 On appeal,
the Texas company, as well as a number of amici including industry groups
representing Google and Apple, argued that the ITC did not have authority
over the dispute because the e-mailed files did not constitute "importation of
139. See Andreas F. Lowenfeld, In Search of the Intangible A Comment on Shaffer v. Heitner, 53
N.Y.U. L. REv. 102, 108 (1978) (describing how intangible assets at times have no situs at
all).
140. See, e.g., Daskal, supra note 20, at 366.
141. Data's mobility may mean that it passes through a number of jurisdictions and as a
consequence is subject to a number of different authorities, but this is neither a novel
problem nor one unique to data.
142. 19 U.S.C. § 1337 (2014).
143. See Certain Digital Models, Digital Data & Treatment Plans for Use in Making
Incremental Dental Positioning Adjustment Appliances, the Appliances Made
Therefrom & Methods of Making the Same, Inv. No. 337-TA-833, USITC Pub. 4555, at
2 (Mar. 30,2012) (notice of institution of investigation).
Against Data Exceptionalism
68 STAN. L. REV. 729 (2016)
'articles.'"144 The Federal Circuit agreed, noting that when the Tariff Act was
passed, the word "articles" did not refer to digital information.145 The case
seems to suggest hat while data's mobility creates novel market arrangements,
it does not present a fundamental theoretical challenge to the way we think
about jurisdiction in the physical, territorial world.
c. Divisibility and fungibility
Another feature of data that some see as problematic for territoriality is its
divisibility and, relatedly, its interchangeability.146 That is, one user's data
might be divided into several different parts and distributed on servers in
different locations or jurisdictions. When an Internet user visits Flickr to view
the photos he uploaded, for example, he does not have a claim over particular
ones and zeros. Rather, the user asks the data holder (in this case, Yahoo!) to
present him with a particular configuration of ones and zeros that will allow
him to see what he deposited in the cloud.147 The ones and zeros are divisible
and interchangeable; the user does not care if they are the same ones and zeros
that were initially uploaded to Flickr, or if they have been divided among or
commingled with other ones and zeros, as long as they are configured in a
certain, recognizable way when he calls upon them.
But these features are neither novel nor unique to data. Consider money in
a bank account. When customers deposit two $5 bills with a bank, they do not
expect the bank to hold that money in its exact form; indeed, they expect that
the bank may divide that money up and distribute it widely around the bank's
many branches (or with the bank's many other customers). But they expect
that when they call upon the bank to make a withdrawal, the bank will give
them $10-made up of some combination of $10 bills, $5 bills, and $1 bills.
144. Brief of Appellants ClearCorrect Operating, LLC, ClearCorrect Pakistan (Private), Ltd.
at 7, ClearCorrect Operating, LLC v. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 2015 WL 6875205 (Fed. Cir.
Nov. 10, 2015) (No. 2014-1527), 2014 WL 5318047; Brief of the Internet Association as
Amicus Curiae in Support of Appellants and Urging Reversal at 2, ClearCorrect
Operating, 2015 WL 6875205 (No. 2014-1527), 2014 WL 5427858; Brief for Business
Software Alliance as Amicus Curiae in Support of Appellants in Favor of Reversal at 6,
ClearCorrect Operating, 2015 WL 6875205 (No. 2014-1527), 2014 WL 5427859.
145. ClearCorrect Operating, 2015 WL 6875205, at 11 (stating that "articles" is defined as
"material things," and thus does not extend to electronic transmission of digital data);
see also Sapna Kumar, Regulating Digital Trade, 67 FLA. L. REV. 1909, 1912-13 (2015)
(describing the debate over the ClearCorrect case); Editorial, Keep the Internet Free of
Borders, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 10, 2015), http://nyti.ms/lWc0wrE (arguing the ITC's ruling
should be overturned given that it is not clear that the ITC has the authority to
consider digital information to be "articles" within the meaning of the Tariff Act).
146. Daskal, supra note 20, at 368.
147. See FLICKR, https://www.flickr.com (last visited Apr. 4, 2016) ("Flickr, a Yahoo
company.").
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These are not the same paper bills the user deposited-those have been divided
and distributed-and they may not even be the same dollar configuration of
bills-the customer may have deposited two $5 bills and received a $10 bill-
but customers do not care because they recognize that money is divisible and
fungible. Once the money is deposited, it will be divided up and it will
commingle with other money; the user's only concern with the money is that
it be there when the user visits the bank. Ones and zeros are fungible, too.
What matters to the user is how those ones and zeros are reconfigured so that
they appear familiar when the user calls the data up on their screen.
What about ones and zeros that are improperly displayed-ones and zeros
that in a given configuration do not reflect the file or image that the user
initially uploaded? Here, too, there is an analogue in the financial world.
Suppose that a user deposits a single $100 bill of U.S. currency in a bank
account. The bank might turn around and exchange that money for some
amount of Mexican pesos or Japanese yen. If the account holder were to call
upon the bank and receive pesos or yen, he may be disappointed-not unlike
the Flickr user who may be disappointed to find his account filled with
someone else's photographs (or worse, a configuration of ones and zeros that
does not depict an image at all). The ones and zeros do not matter to the user,
just as the particular $100 bill does not matter to the banker; what matters is
what the data controller, like the bank, produces when the user comes calling.
d. Distance between the asset holder and the asset
The fact that users may not be in the same location as their data, and may
not know where it is, has led some to suggest that data is incompatible with
territorially bound legal rules.148 But this separation is not unique to data.
Money can be stored in an offshore bank account; debts can be held against
someone in another jurisdiction; and someone might hold stock in a mutual
fund that is located in another jurisdiction, and the mutual fund might hold
stocks in companies distributed around a huge number of jurisdictions. In each
of these scenarios, there is a jurisdictional barrier between the asset holder and
the asset, and yet courts have simple rules to establish a location for the asset
and to determine their jurisdiction over the dispute in question.149 Data should
be no different.
2. Data as a physical asset
All of the features that are thought to make data difficult to square with a
territorial conception of jurisdiction are premised on the idea that data is hard
148. Daskal, supra note 20, at 369-73.
149. See supra notes 133-36 and accompanying text.
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to locate. But in many ways, it is easier for courts to assert jurisdiction over
data than over intangible assets because, unlike debts or stock, data has a
physical and therefore territorial presence wherever it is stored. Unlike stocks,
debts, and bank wires, data resides on physical drives that can be seized.'5 0 In
fact, while it may feel to the casual Internet user as if data floats around in a
transnational ether, it is in fact stored in a physical location, usually one near
the user. Microsoft's own affidavits in the Microsoft Corp. case suggest that data
centers are located as near as possible to the end user.151 Moreover, as a number
of network engineers and computer scientists attested in that case, it is in fact
impractical for companies handling massive amounts of data to parse
individual accounts and spread the accounts across different jurisdictions if
they do not need to do so.152 If the user stays put in a particular location, it
makes sense for the data to stay put as well.
This suggests that data is in fact much more tangible than classic
intangibles like debts or stock. It may not matter to typical banking customers
whether their money is held in Switzerland, Japan, or the Cayman Islands, as
long as it is available when they need it. Yet it does matter to typical cloud users
where their data is stored because where it is stored affects how quickly they
can access it and-crucially-which governments can access it. For example,
when Google did not want China to have access to its customers' data, Google
felt it necessary to move to Hong Kong.153 Google stores customer data on
servers in nearby Taiwan and Singapore, rather than in Hong Kong or
China.154 By doing this, Google can offer some of its services to customers in
China but keep the data out of the reach of the Chinese authorities 155-an
150. See, e.g., Verne G. Kopytoff, F.B.I Seizes Web Servers, Knocking Sites Offline, N.Y. TIMES:
BITS (June 21, 2011, 5:54 PM), http://nyti.ms/RBVouW.
151. See Microsoft E-mail Search Warrant Case, 15 F. Supp. 3d 466, 467 (S.D.N.Y. 2014)
("[Blecause the quality of service decreases the farther a user is from the datacenter
where his account is hosted, efforts are made to assign each account to the closest
datacenter."), appeal docketed sub nom. Microsoft Corp. v. United States, No. 14-2985-cv
(2d Cir. argued Sept. 9, 2015).
152. See Brief for Amici Curiae Computer and Data Science Experts in Support of Appellant
Microsoft Corp. at 21, Microsoft Corp., No. 14-2985-cv ("[T]he impracticalities of...
partitioning very small segments of data across geographically dispersed data centers
mean that a given individual's email will generally be isolated to a particular region, if
not a particular datacenter and server, regardless of the vendor.").
153. See Miguel Helft & David Barboza, Google Shuts China Site in Dispute over Censorship, N.Y.
TIMES (Mar. 22, 2010), http://nyti.ms/xHQBAt (describing Google's decision to leave
China and its hope to retain some customers there by routing web users to its Chinese-
language site based in Hong Kong).
154. Roland Lim, Goodbye Google Data Center in Hong Kong, ZDNET (Dec. 11, 2013, 9:14 AM
GMT), http://zd.net/lkybGkX.
155. See Helft & Barboza, supra note 153.
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arrangement that implicitly acknowledges the importance of data's physical
location.
Courts have acknowledged data's physical properties in a number of
different contexts. Some of the earliest cases were insurance claims where
courts had to decide whether data losses were covered by a standard
commercial insurance contract that protects against direct physical loss or
damage. Most courts that considered the question answered in the
affirmative.15 6 The Fourth Circuit, the first federal appellate court to address
the issue, found that data loss constitutes direct physical damage in NMS
Services, Inc. v. Hartford.157 In that case, one of the plaintiff's former employees
used a backdoor program that he had installed while still at the company to
remotely log in and delete important files and databases.158 The defendant had
insured the plaintiff for business income lost due to suspension of operations
where that suspension was caused by "direct physical loss of or damage to
property."159 The court found that there was "no question that [the plaintiff]
suffered damage to its property" and that it was physical damage.16° As Judge
Widener noted in his concurrence:
[A] computer stores information by the rearrangement of the atoms or molecules
of a disc or tape to effect the formation of a particular order of magnetic impulses,
and a meaningful sequence of magnetic impulses cannot float in space. It is the
fact that the erasure was a 'direct physical loss' that enables [plaintiff] to recover
under the policy .... 161
In a similar case, a district court found that under Louisiana law, data can be
subject to "direct, physical 'loss or damage." 162
Not all courts have found that data losses of this kind were tangible losses,
however.163 A California court found that where hard drives were erased but
156. See, e.g., Se. Mental Health Ctr., Inc. v. Pac. Ins., 439 F. Supp. 2d 831, 839 (W.D. Tenn.
2006) (finding that data lost due to a power outage constituted direct physical loss
under the insurance policy); Am. Guarantee & Liab. Ins. Co. v. Ingram Micro, Inc.,
No. 99-185, 2000 WL 726789, at *3-4 (D. Ariz. Apr. 18, 2000) (holding that data loss
suffered due to a power outage was "physical damage" because without the data, the
machines had little functionality); Lambrecht & Assocs. v. State Farm Lloyds, 119
S.W.3d 16, 26 (Tex. App. 2003) (finding that insurance company's own policy coverage
for data stored electronically dictated that "such property is capable of sustaining a
'physical' loss," and therefore holding that the plaintiff's insurance coverage included
data lost due to a virus).
157. 62 F. App'x 511, 514-15 (4th Cir. 2003).
158. Id. at 512-13.
159. Id. at 514 (emphasis omitted).
160. Id.
161. Id. at 515 (Widener, J., concurring) (citation omitted).
162. Landmark Am. Ins. Co. v. Gulf Coast Analytical Labs., Inc., Civ. No. 10-809, 2012
WL 1094761, at *4 (M.D. La. 2012).
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unharmed, there was no tangible loss.164 And the Fourth Circuit-the same
court that decided NMS Services-found that data is not tangible because it
cannot be touched.165 One explanation for this split is that courts are
struggling with data's dual nature-at once physical and intangible. As we will
see, both of these features may be grounds for a state to assert jurisdiction.
166
C. Summary
At a deep conceptual level, data is not as novel as the data exceptionalists
suggest. None of the features that are thought to make data novel are in fact
novel-whether the features are considered individually or as a whole-and in
fact, data is an easier case than some other assets because data has a physical
location wherever it is stored. Courts have at least two lines of inquiry for
determining when a state ought to be able to properly assert jurisdiction over
data in the cloud. First, courts can treat data as an intangible asset, much the
way they treat money, debts, stock, and other similar items. Intangible assets
constitute a significant strand of conflicts-of-laws jurisprudence, and courts
have long negotiated jurisdictional claims for assets that have no physical
presence in a given jurisdiction.167 Second, courts can treat data as the physical
object that it is-electronic, magnetic, and physical switches that sit on servers
that are bolted to the ground. To be sure, cloud-stored data raises a number of
complex jurisdictional problems, but efforts to solve these problems need not
begin from the premise that data changes the way that courts currently think
about jurisdiction and location.
163. See John N. Love & Ann F. Ketchen, Physical but Not Tangible: Electronic Data Losses,
LAw360 (Nov. 30, 2010), http://www.robinskaplan.com/-/media/pdfs/physical%20but
%20not%20tangible%20electronic%20data%201osses.pdf?la=en (suggesting that data loss
has been largely found to be direct physical loss, but there are some exceptions,
especially in the third-party insurance context where the loss must be tangible as well
as physical).
164. Ward Gen. Ins. Servs. Inc. v. Emp'rs Fire Ins. Co., 7 Cal. Rptr. 3d 844, 851 (Ct. App. 2003)
("Here, the loss suffered by plaintiff was a loss of information, i.e., the sequence of ones
and zeros stored by aligning small domains of magnetic material on the computer's
hard drive in a machine-readable manner. Plaintiff did not lose the tangible material of
the storage medium. Rather, plaintiff lost the stored information. The sequence of ones
and zeros can be altered, rearranged, or erased, without losing or damaging the tangible
material of the storage medium." (emphasis omitted) (footnote omitted)).
165. Am. Online, Inc. v. St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co., 207 F. Supp. 2d 459, 462 (E.D. Va. 2002)
("[Clomputer data, software and systems are not 'tangible' property in the common
sense understanding of the word. The plain and ordinary meaning of the term
'tangible' is property that can be touched. Computer data, software and systems are
incapable of perception by any of the senses and are therefore intangible.").
166. See infra Part Ill.
167. See Simowitz, supra note 24, at 7.
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III. Jurisdiction over Data in the Cloud
The previous Part showed that data is not conceptually exceptional; this
Part shows that even if data had unprecedented features, it would not shake
"territoriality at its core,"168 nor would it erode state jurisdiction.169
Jurisdiction is and likely always will be rooted in territoriality. States are the
sovereigns of their territory and their citizens.170 Accordingly, they can
regulate acts taking place on their soil as well as acts that affect their citizens,
regardless of the location of those acts. This means that a state might
legitimately assert its jurisdiction over a piece of data because that data or its
controller is located in the state's territory, or simply because the data is needed
for law enforcement there, regardless of where the data is stored or where the
company is headquartered. It also means that Microsoft is wrong when it
suggests that the territorial location of the physical drives is the sole
determinant of which state's laws apply,171 just as Google is wrong when it
suggests that the sole determinant is the domicile of the company. 172
According to longstanding international law jurisprudence, there are three
general categories of jurisdiction: jurisdiction to prescribe, to enforce, and to
adjudicate.173 This Part will discuss the first two.174 The importance of the
168. Daskal, supra note 20, at 397.
169. Contra Teresa Scassa & Robert J. Currie, New First Principles" Assessing the Internet's
Challenges to Jurisdiction, 42 GEO.J. INT'L L. 1017, 1063 (2011) ("Not only does the Internet
pose new challenges for states in terms of how to determine when and how they should
exercise their jurisdiction, the Internet and the related phenomenon of globalization
also have an eroding effect on jurisdiction.").
170. This is quite an old principle. For a relatively recent treatment, see Joseph H. Beale, The
Jurisdiction of a Sovereign State, 36 HARv. L. REv. 241, 252 (1923). See also JOSEPH STORY,
COMMENTARIES ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS § 18, at 21 (Boston, Little, Brown & Co.
8th ed. 1883) (1834).
171. Brief for Appellant, supra note 28, at 31-33 (arguing that the territorial location of its
servers is the relevant location for the purposes of the territoriality provisions of
ECPA); see also Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 12, at 4-5 (counsel for
Microsoft agreeing with Judge Lynch's characterization of Microsoft's claim that it can
choose where to store data, and that it must follow the laws of the state where the data
physically rests, seemingly to the exclusion of other state laws).
172. See Vidal-Hall v. Google Inc, [2014] EWHC (QB) 13 (rejecting Google's contention that
the court lacked jurisdiction to hear a case because the relevant activity occurred, in
Google's view, in California).
173. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 401
(AM. LAW INST. 1987). Adjudicative jurisdiction represents the same concept as personal
jurisdiction. This conversation assumes that personal jurisdiction is not a question
because without personal jurisdiction, there is little to litigate.
174. In many of the scenarios discussed here, like that being litigated in Microsoft Corp., the
court's personal jurisdiction over the parties is simply not in question. Many of the
earliest Internet jurisdiction cases were concerned exclusively with personal
jurisdiction. In those cases, courts largely adopted one of two approaches: the Calder
footnote continued on next page
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distinction between prescriptive and enforcement jurisdiction for the Internet
was first identified by Jack Goldsmith, who noted that while states might have
a number of reasons to regulate extraterritorial Internet activities, they may
struggle to enforce them, a question explored in the second section of this
Part.175 Ultimately, the data exceptionalists are wrong to suggest hat the cloud
changes anything fundamental as a matter of prescriptive jurisdiction or
enforcement jurisdiction; the same old (territorial) rules apply to this new
Internet technology.
A. Prescriptive Jurisdiction
States have essentially five bases to assert the jurisdiction necessary to
prescribe conduct. A state can prescribe law with regard to: (1) conduct that
takes place within its territory; (2) persons or things within its territory;
(3) extraterritorial conduct that has or is intended to have substantial effects
within its territory; (4) the activities of its nationals regardless of location; and
(5) conduct outside the state that is directed against the security of the state or
its interests.176 These categories are drawn from international law, and as such,
they do not bind Congress,177 but they do impact U.S. law in at least two ways.
First, the categories influence judicial interpretation of statutes via the
Charming Betsy principle, which holds that "an act of Congress ought never to
be construed to violate the law of nations if any other possible construction
remains."17 8 Second, the categories find rich support in U.S. case law.
179
Translating these categories to the context of the Microsoft Corp. case, there are
five-and possibly more-potential jurisdictional hooks that a state might use
to assert jurisdiction over cloud-based data: (1) the location of the data; (2) the
location of the harm; (3) the citizenship of the suspect; (4) the citizenship of the
"effects" test or the Zippo "sliding scale" test. See CTR. ON LAW & INFO. POLICY AT
FORDHAM LAW SCH., INTERNET JURISDICTION: A SURVEY OF LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP
PUBLISHED IN ENGLISH AND UNITED STATES CASE LAW 58 (2013), http://www.fordham
.edu/downloads/file/1826/clip-internet-jurisdiction_-_united-states; see also Calder
v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783 (1984); Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119
(W.D. Pa. 1997).
175. See Goldsmith, Against Cyberanarchy, supra note 26, at 1216-17 (describing the limits of
enforcement jurisdiction).
176. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 402.
177. See United States v. Yousef, 327 F.3d 56, 86 (2d Cir. 2003) (noting that "Congress is not
bound by international law" and "may legislate with respect to conduct outside the
United States, in excess of the limits posed by international law," but that Congress
must explicitly state that they intend to do so).
178. Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64,118 (1804).
179. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 402
case citations.
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victim; and (5) the citizenship of the data controller.180 As a matter of
prescriptive jurisdiction, a state might assert jurisdiction over the crime based
on any of these elements.
181
These bases for jurisdiction suggest that states have extremely broad
latitude to prescribe laws that regulate overseas conduct, as long as that
conduct touches the state's territory or its citizens through its effects. 182 One of
the lessons of this analysis is that a single test for jurisdiction-the location of
the data, as Microsoft urges,183 or the location of the company headquarters, as
Google and others urge184-is unlikely to dictate a state's ability to assert
jurisdiction over data.185 Rather, the last century of conflicts of laws shows
courts embracing a mosaic of different grounds for asserting jurisdiction over a
particular act, depending on the act's location, its effects, and the citizenship of
the parties involved.186 What follows is a brief discussion of only five potential
grounds for asserting prescriptive jurisdiction over data in the cloud.
1. Location of the data
The first and perhaps most obvious basis for jurisdiction is the location of
the data.187 As the previous Part demonstrated, data is both territorial and
intangible. The territorial aspect of data is unlikely to go away: as long as states
can seize physical hard drives that are bolted down on their sovereign soil, it
seems unlikely that they will accept-absent a voluntary waiver of sovereignty
via treaty-limits to their jurisdiction over the physical evidence within their
territory. Servers are tangible, physical evidence bolted to a particular
180. There are others, such as the location of the criminal and the victim, but the arguments
for or against these bases are largely repetitive of the arguments for asserting
jurisdiction over the activities in the state's territory, so they are omitted here.
181. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 403.
182. See Goldsmith, Against Cyberanarchy, supra note 26, at 1208 ("[A] transaction can
legitimately be regulated by the jurisdiction where the transaction occurs, the
jurisdictions where significant effects of the transaction are felt, and the jurisdictions
where the parties burdened by the regulation are from.").
183. Microsoft's Objections, supra note 4, at 21; see also supra note 171 and accompanying
text.
184. See supra note 29.
185. Congress might nonetheless elect to pick a single test and voluntarily narrow the
state's ability to reach data abroad, but as a matter of jurisdictional scope, international
transactions are increasingly regulated by more than one jurisdiction.
186. Goldsmith, Against Cyberanarchy, supra note 26, at 1208 ("The earlier belief in a unique
governing law for all transnational activities has given way to the view that more than
one jurisdiction can legitimately apply its law to the same transnational activity.").
187. This is the only jurisdictional hook that Microsoft suggests should dictate which states
have the ability to compel data. See supra note 171 and accompanying text.
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territory, and they can be seized.188 This fact will not disappear at the urging of
legal scholars.189 This will likely not come as a surprise to the general counsels
of the leading Internet companies, who have chosen the locations of their
servers with a number of concerns in mind.190 There is no reason to think that
regulatory arbitrage-which is already widely practiced on a global scale
191-
should not also extend to the world of Internet data.
2. Location of the harm
States have a considerable interest in ensuring that their laws are enforced.
For this reason, one sound basis for jurisdiction would be to say that the state
where the crime occurred has a compelling interest in gaining access to digital
evidence necessary to enforce its laws. Suppose, for example, that law
enforcement agents at Scotland Yard are investigating a string of bank
robberies in London, and they decide that critical evidence likely resides on
one of the suspect's Dropbox accounts. Dropbox has its headquarters in
California, but until recently it relied on Amazon Web Services for its data
storage, and Amazon stores data on servers around the world. 192 No one doubts
188. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
189. As Goldsmith notes, enforcement jurisdiction very often ends up being a greater
limitation on a country's ability to enforce its laws on the Internet than prescriptive
jurisdiction or choice of law. This problem is considerably easier to solve when the data
sit on servers within the state's territory that can be seized. See Goldsmith, Against
Cyberanarchy, supra note 26, at 1217 ("A defendant's physical presence or assets within
the territory remains the primary basis for a nation or state to enforce its laws.").
190. Henry McDonald, Ireland Is Cool for Google as Its Data Servers Like the Weather,
GUARDIAN (Dec. 22, 2012, 7:08 PM EST), http://gu.com/p/3cy4p/sbl (describing how
many of the world's leading technology companies have chosen to house much of their
data in Ireland for a number of reasons, including a well-educated, English-speaking
workforce; extremely low corporate taxes; and cool weather); see also Chertoff Grp.,
Law Enforcement Access to Evidence in the Cloud Era 8-9 (2015), http://www
.chertoffgroup.com/cms-assets/documents/209798-892097.law-enforcement-access-to
-evidence-in (noting how companies have an incentive to store data in the jurisdiction
with the most favorable data access rules).
191. See, e.g., Victor Fleischer, Regulatory Arbitrage, 89 TEx. L. REV. 227, 229-30, 275-76 (2010)
(describing how legally sophisticated actors move their assets to different locations in
order to take advantage of the different regulatory systems in place); Annelise Riles,
Managing Regulatory Arbitrage A Conflict of Laws Approach, 47 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 63, 64,
96-97 (2014) (describing how companies such as AIG conduct some transactions
overseas in an effort to take comparative advantage of different legal regimes).
192. See Sebastian Anthony, Amazon Launches Cut-Price Dropbox Competitor Zocalo, Takes a
Page from Microsoft's Monopolistic Playbook, EXTREMETECH (July 11, 2014, 8:06
AM), http://www.extremetech.com/computing/186150-amazon-launches-cut-price
-dropbox-competitor-zocalo-takes-a-page-from-microsofts-monopolistic-playbook
(describing how Dropbox has long used Amazon's servers to host its cloud service).
Amazon's web servers are located around the world, so the data in this hypothetical
could be in Germany, Ireland, or the United States. See Region Table, AMAZON WEB
footnote continued on next page
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that the U.K. Parliament has the legislative jurisdiction to pass a law
criminalizing bank robbery. Indeed, it has a rock-solid jurisdictional basis for
doing so-namely, controlling the activities that occur on its soil.193 Getting
access to digital evidence related to a U.K. crime-evidence that may or may
not be in the United Kingdom's territory-is a question of enforcement
jurisdiction, which will be discussed in more detail below.
3. Citizenship of the suspect
Another possible nexus for jurisdiction is the citizenship of the user whose
data is being sought. States have an interest in protecting their citizens, and so
it makes good sense that courts would strive to allow states to define when and
under what conditions law enforcement should be able to access a citizen's data,
wherever it is stored. Of course, one of the problems with this test is that the
citizenship of the user is not always clear. (Though between the state and the
Internet service provider, one would presume that citizenship can often be
determined.) A second, and perhaps more troubling, problem is that such a test
could encourage gaming. Criminals seeking to keep their data at bay from law
enforcement in a particular state may self-identify online as having citizenship
in whatever country will make law enforcement's job the most difficult-
presumably a country with a blocking statute.
4. Citizenship of the victim
Likewise, states have a considerable interest in protecting their citizens
from harm. Regardless of where a crime has been committed, a state may have
an interest in seeking evidence related to the crime in order to get justice for
their citizen, the victim. This basis for jurisdiction raises similar concerns to
those raised by a test that turns on the location of the user. First, it may be
difficult to identify the citizenship of the victim, though again the data
controller and law enforcement might work together to identify the user's
citizenship. Second, citizens seeking extra privacy from their own government
may self-identify as being from a foreign country precisely in order to limit
SERVS., http://aws.amazon.com/about-aws/global-infrastructure/regional-product
-services (last visited Apr. 4, 2016). There is some evidence that Dropbox is moving
away from Amazon Web Services, and this hypothetical might play out differently if
Dropbox stores its data in-country. See Barb Darrow, AWS in Fight of Its Life as
Customers like Dropbox Ponder Hybrid Clouds and Google Pricing, GIGAOM (July 25, 2014,
11:19 AM PST), https://gigaom.com/2014/07/25/aws-in-fight-of-its-life-as-customers
-like-dropbox-ponder-hybrid-clouds-and-google-pricing.
193. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 402
(AM. LAW INST. 1987) ("Subject to § 403, a state has jurisdiction to prescribe law with
respect to . . . conduct that, wholly or in substantial part, takes place within its
territory ....- ).
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their home state's ability to access their data,194 which could perversely make it
difficult for their home state to help them in the event hat they are victimized.
5. Citizenship of the data controller
Finally, states have a considerable interest in regulating the commercial
activity that takes place on their soil, including transnational data storage and
cloud computing services. For example, the U.S. government has the authority
to dictate the activity of its citizen corporations abroad, including prohibiting
the payment of bribes.195 It should not matter that the activities of that
company are felt around the world via the Internet, rather than by some other
means. The U.S. government's interest in regulating the foreign behavior of an
oil company and the foreign behavior of an Internet company ought to be the
same. The government might have different substantive reasons for egulating
one as opposed to the other, but its fundamental interest in regulating the
corporation should not change.
Ultimately, there are a number of ways that states might assert
prescriptive jurisdiction over cloud-based data. That data might be mobile,
divisible, and stored on different servers around the world-those facts do not
fundamentally change the state's ability to regulate things and people that
touch its soil.19 6 The harder question, especially in cases where the underlying
crime is domestic but the data is stored in the cloud, is how to determine limits
on the state's enforcement jurisdiction.
B. Enforcement Jurisdiction
The rule for enforcement jurisdiction is quite simple: "a nation can exercise
enforcement jurisdiction only against persons or entities with a presence or
194. See, e.g., Sealed Indictment at 1, 7, United States v. Paunescu, No. 13 Cr. 41 (S.D.N.Y.
Jan. 17, 2013) (alleging that an Internet service provider violated the Computer Fraud
and Abuse Act when it provided a hosting service that allowed people to mask their
location and identity online in order to evade law enforcement detection).
195. See Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977 §§ 103(a), 104, 104A, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd- 1 to -3
(2014). The only federal appellate case to examine the scope of the Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act (FCPA) is United States v. Kay, 513 F.3d 432, 440-43 (5th Cir. 2007)
(endorsing the SEC's broad view that the FCPA covers not only payments made to
foreign officials to obtain or retain business, but also any improper payments that
facilitate general business activities).
196. Indeed, neither side in the Microsoft E-mail Search Warrant Case disputes the state's
authority to proscribe the underlying conduct. See Government's Brief in Support of
the Magistrate Judge's Decision to Uphold a Warrant Ordering Microsoft to Disclose
Records Within Its Custody and Control, Microsoft E-mail Search Warrant Case, 15
F. Supp. 3d 466 (S.D.N.Y. 2014), appeal docketed sub nom. Microsoft Corp. v. United States,
No. 14-2985-cv (2d Cir. argued Sept. 9, 2015) (No. 13 Mag. 2814); Microsoft's Objections,
supra note 4.
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assets within its territory."197 If an Internet company has an office or bank
account in a country, those assets are liable to being seized in order to compel
the company to hand over data held by the company, wherever it might
happen to be stored.198 In such a case, concerns about data's incompatibility
with notions of territoriality are largely irrelevant. As Goldsmith wrote over
fifteen years ago, "A defendant's physical presence or assets within the territory
remains the primary basis for a nation or state to enforce its laws."199
Indeed, courts regularly enforce foreign judgments when they are able to
assert personal jurisdiction over the defendant, even if the assets are not within
the jurisdiction, as long as doing so would not subject the parties to double
liability or egregiously violate foreign law.200 This is well supported by case
law in the United States and abroad. Ireland's own amicus brief in the Microsoft
Corp. case asserts as much: "It appears that in certain circumstances, an Irish
court is prepared to order the disclosure by an Irish corporation of information
in its possession, notwithstanding that the information is physically located in
another jurisdiction .... "201 And over a half-century ago, the Second Circuit
ruled that, "It is no longer open to doubt that a federal court has the power to
require the production of documents located in foreign countries if the court
has in personam jurisdiction of the person in possession or control of the
material."202 This is true in criminal cases as well.20 3 U.S. courts have been
clear: global companies that publicly avail themselves of business opportunities
in the United States are subject to this country's criminal laws, and they can be
197. Goldsmith, Unilateral Regulation, supra note 26, at 139.
198. Servers can be seized too, of course, which is one reason why the suggestion that data is
not territorial makes little sense.
199. Goldsmith, Against Cyberanarchy, supra note 26, at 1217. This is largely the approach
taken by courts evaluating American surveillance law, which places greater
constitutional scrutiny on government action addressed towards both people and data
within the United States. See Daskal, supra note 20, at 345.
200. Simowitz, supra note 24, at 7.
201. Brief of Amicus Curiae Ireland, supra note 11, at 7.
202. United States v. First Nat'l City Bank, 396 F.2d 897, 900-01 (2d Cir. 1968) (emphasis
omitted).
203. While the Restatement claims that extraterritorial enforcement of criminal laws is
universally condemned, it is generally allowed for discovery purposes. Compare
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 432
cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 1987) ("It is universally recognized, as a corollary of state
sovereignty, that officials of one state may not exercise their functions in the territory
of another state without the latter's consent."), with id. § 442(0)(a) ("A court or agency in
the United States, when authorized by statute or rule of court, may order a person
subject to its jurisdiction to produce documents, objects, or other information relevant
to an action or investigation, even if the information or the person in possession of the
information is outside the United States.").
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compelled to bring assets and evidence from abroad into the United States.
2 °4
U.S. courts will not issue warrants for extraterritorial searches.205 But
extraterritorial subpoenas are generally available, subject to a reasonableness
test that balances the privacy interests of the person whose data is being
searched with the government's interest in the data.20 6 So even if the United
States cannot send agents to another country to seize data held abroad, the
United States can compel a company that operates in the United States and has
violated U.S. law to produce those same documents if they relate to the
crime.
207
The crucial question in enforcement cases is not where the data is stored-
or how mobile, interchangeable, or tangible it is-but rather whether the court
can assert personal jurisdiction over a defendant with the ability to access that
data.20 8 This fact matters today in a way that it did not fifteen years ago because
courts increasingly have personal jurisdiction over global Internet companies.
When Goldsmith wrote about enforcement jurisdiction, he noted that
enforcement jurisdiction serves as a significant limitation on states exercising
jurisdiction over online actors, despite the fact that the activity is well within
the state's prescriptive jurisdiction.2°9 That is less true today. The major
technology firms that have significant global Internet user bases also have
significant assets and offices around the world. In 2004, Google had one office
204. See, e.g., United States v. Bank of N.S., 740 F.2d 817, 828 (11 th Cir. 1984) (noting that the
cost of business in different foreign jurisdictions includes taking the risk that a conflict
of laws may arise); In re One Grand Jury Subpoena Returnable January 11, 1989, No. N-
89-7, 1989 WL 49165, at *3 (D. Conn. Mar. 22, 1989) ('[B]anks involved in international
commerce must often face the risk of inconsistent government actions. That risk is an
incident of international banking, and with the decision to enter that field of
commerce comes such a risk.").
205. See In re Terrorist Bombings of U.S. Embassies in E. Ar., 552 F.3d 157, 171 (2d Cir. 2008)
(noting that warrants do not have extraterritorial reach).
206. Orin Kerr, What Legal Protections Apply to E-mail Stored Outside the US?, WASH. POST:
VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (July 7,2014), http://wpo.st/U5i9l.
207. See Bank of N.S., 740 F.2d at 828, 832.
208. Microsoft implicitly acknowledged this point when it set up a data center in Germany
through an unusual trustee relationship with Deutsch Telekom that would give
Microsoft no ability to control the data held there. See Glyn Moody, Microsoft Building
Data Centers in Germany that US Government Can't Touch, ARs TECHNICA (Nov. 12, 2015,
10.07 AM PST), http://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2015/11/microsoft
-is-building-data-centres-in-germany-that-the-us-government-cant-touch. T is was
likely designed so that customers storing their data there could be sure that the United
States could not compel Microsoft to hand over that data using a Bank of Nova Scotia-
type subpoena-a subpoena for foreign records-of the sort the government seeks to
use in the Microsoft Corp. case.
209. Goldsmith, Against Cyberanarchy, supra note 26, at 1216.
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with around 800 employees.2 10 Today, the company has nearly 60,000
employees,211 working in 70 offices in more than 40 countries.212 If a country
feels it has a legitimate interest in accessing data stored by Google, the critical
question may not be where the data is stored, but rather whether the country
can assert personal jurisdiction over Google's assets in the country.
213
C. Integrated Analysis
Taken together, these grounds for jurisdiction provide the beginnings of a
flow chart for thinking through the jurisdictional problems that arise when
the state attempts to access data in the cloud. What if someone is kidnapped
from Manhattan and the New York police has good reason to think that
critical evidence might be in the Viber account of the victim's boyfriend, who
is also missing? If the law enforcement agents ask Viber for the data, and Viber
insists that they seek a warrant from a judge in Cyprus or Israel, how should a
court approach the case?214 The first question, of course, is whether the court
has personal jurisdiction over the matter before it-what is classically referred
to as adjudicatory jurisdiction.2 15 Assuming that it does, the next question
would be how existing law applies to the conflict.
The court would have to ask how the Fourth Amendment and the SCA
apply to the Viber account and whether the Viber account is "extraterritorial."
If the account is extraterritorial, it likely does not enjoy Fourth Amendment
210. Our History in Depth, GOOGLE, http://www.google.com/about/company/history (last
visited Apr. 4,2016).
211. Google Inc., Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q), at 32 (Sept. 30, 2015), http://www.sec.gov
/Archives/edgar/data/1288776/000128877615000046/goog10-qq32015.htm ("Headcount
increased to 59,976 as of September 30, 2015.").
212. Google Locations, GOOGLE, http://www.google.com/about/company/facts/locations
(last visited Apr. 4, 2016).
213. This is consistent with the view of the United States in the Microsoft litigation. See
Brief for the United States of America at 5, Microsoft Corp. v. United States, No. 14-
2985-cv (2d Cir. Mar. 9, 2015) (citing with approval the magistrate judge's decision that
Microsoft must produce the data sought, "regardless of the location of that
information," given the issuance of the warrant). This analysis may become more
complicated if the Internet service provider in question is incorporated as a subsidiary.
The Supreme Court has recently narrowed the ability of courts to assert personal
jurisdiction over a parent corporation based solely on its subsidiary, and vice versa. See
Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746,761-62 (2014).
214. See supra text accompanying note 85.
215. This distinction is commonly taught in civil procedure courses as one between
personal and subject matter jurisdiction. See JACK H. FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., CIVIL
PROCEDURE: CASES AND MATERIALS 26 (10th ed. 2009) ("A court must be chosen that has
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the suit and in which jurisdiction over the
person of the defendant may be obtained.").
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protections.216 Whether and how the SCA applies is, of course, the core
concern in the Microsoft Corp. case: Did Congress intend for ECPA to reach a
criminal suspect's data where the data is stored on foreign servers?2 17 If it is at
all unclear, the court would have to inquire whether the legislature had the
authority to reach the data in question. This is a prescriptive jurisdictional
analysis, and as we have seen there are a number of legitimate grounds for
asserting prescriptive jurisdiction over data. Finally, even if Congress has the
prescriptive jurisdiction to reach the data, there is a remaining question about
the scope of the state's enforcement powers over that data. The next question,
of course, is whether exercising that jurisdictional authority would create a
conflict of laws.
This analysis is deeply territorial and not fundamentally different from an
analysis of jurisdiction over foreign-held intangible assets. The fact that the
subject of the dispute is ones and zeros does not ultimately change very much
about how the court asserts personal jurisdiction over the defendant, interprets
existing constitutional and statutory law, or examines international law and
common law limits on jurisdiction.
This may explain why a number of jurisdictions have asserted something
akin to a minimum contacts test similar to that articulated in International Shoe
Co. v. Washington to determine jurisdiction over Internet companies.2 18 In the
Google Spain case, for example, the European Court of Justice found that Google
was properly subject to European regulation as a result of its Spanish
subsidiary's "exercise of activity through stable arrangements in Spain."2 19 And
under the sweeping European Data Protection Directive, a firm can be bound
by European law where the processing of personal data happens "in the context
of the activities of an establishment of the controller on the territory of the
Member State."220 It may not be an easy task to identify a simple test for
determining when sufficient contacts exist in the Internet space, but it is not
conceptually as novel as it seems.
216. See Kerr, supra note 15, at 301.
217. Microsoft E-mail Search Warrant Case, 15 F. Supp. 3d 466, 467-68 (S.D.N.Y. 2014), appeal
docketed sub nom. Microsoft Corp. v. United States, No. 14-2985-cv (2d Cir. argued
Sept. 9, 2015). As Kerr notes about the case, this is essentially an open question: "[T]he
Stored Communications Act just wasn't drafted with the problem of territoriality in
mind. It assumed a U.S. Internet with U.S. servers and U.S. users." Kerr, supra note 206.
218. 326 U.S. 310, 316, 320 (1945) (finding a shoe company to have sufficient contacts for
personal jurisdiction in the state of Washington because its sales efforts there were
systematic and continuous).
219. Case C-131/12, Google Spain SL v. Agencia Espahiola de Protecci6n de Datos (AEPD),
2014 E.C.R. para. 49, http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jspftext=&docid
= 152065&doclang=EN.
220. Directive 95/46/EC, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995
on the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on
the Free Movement of Such Data, art. 4, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31.
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IV. Conflicts of Laws over the Cloud
Because there are many different grounds for states to assert jurisdiction
over the same piece of data, cloud-based data will regularly be subject to
overlapping jurisdictions.22 1 Where two states' laws do conflict, courts have a
suite of tools at their disposal. None of these tools change as a result of the fact
that the subject of the conflict is data stored in the cloud. Ultimately, the
conflicts-of-laws questions presented by cloud-based data are conceptually no
different than other transnational activities, even if their consequences are
more profound. This Part explains how basic conflicts-of-laws principles apply
to disputes involving data stored in the cloud.
Before going any further, a clarification is in order. One could imagine
objections to this proposal on the grounds that conflicts-of-laws principles
derive from private law and this proposal applies them to public law disputes.
But, this view leans too heavily on a simplistic distinction between public and
private law. As Goldsmith noted over a decade ago when applying conflicts
principles to early questions of Internet jurisdiction, some of the most
influential conflicts principles were developed as a result of public law
initiatives to control a globalizing world.222 The history of conflicts cases-and
indeed jurisdiction theory more broadly-involves a heavy dose of both
private and public law cases. Moreover, as William Dodge has shown, there is a
growing need for conflicts principles to be applied to public law subjects.
223
This is underscored by the fact that as the regulatory state has grown, so has
the need for greater flexibility among conflicts rules. Indeed, "many of the
transformative midcentury constitutional choice-of-law decisions involved
public regulations rather than private law."
224
A. A Conflicts Approach to Evidence in the Global Cloud
When should a country be able to get access to data stored in the cloud and
possibly subject o another country's laws? The answer provided by conflicts of
laws is simple: when the state has an interest in that data that outweighs
competing state interests. Any single test for location of data would be overly
narrow. Accordingly, it is wrong to say that the test is or even ought to turn
exclusively on the location of the data or the domicile of the company. Rather,
there are many different ways for a state to legitimately assert its jurisdiction
221. Goldsmith, Against Cyberanarchy, supra note 26, at 1208.
222. Id. at 1206 n.27.
223. William S. Dodge, Breaking the Public Law Taboo, 43 HARV. INT'L LJ. 161,163 (2002).
224. Goldsmith, Against Cyberanarchy, supra note 26, at 1206 n.27 (citing a number of
antitrust and workers' compensation cases).
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over a given piece of data.225 That is not to say that location is irrelevant.
Rather, the state where the data is located will have an interest in the data.
Given these various jurisdictional hooks, the next question is how courts ought
to conclude that one state's interest in the data trumps another state's interest.
The first challenge is to identify whether a conflict exists at all; if a conflict
does exist, a court would then attempt to weigh the two states' interests in
enforcing their laws, an analysis that may depend on the principle of
reciprocity.
1. Identifying true conflicts
Regardless of how states define their jurisdiction over cloud-based data,
conflicts are likely to arise. For example, we should expect that states will
assert jurisdiction over data based on its tangible properties as well as its
intangible properties. If some piece of data gives rise to jurisdiction in one
location based on its intangible properties, and the data is stored in another
location-one that might claim jurisdiction over it as a tangible asset-a
conflict may arise.226 But a true conflict of laws only exists where two states
both have: (1) jurisdiction to prescribe certain conduct; (2) jurisdiction to
enforce their laws such that there is a conflict about which state should have
access to the relevant data; and (3) an interest in having their laws applied. That
is, conflicts can only arise where state jurisdiction over a piece of data overlaps,
and even then not all cases of jurisdictional overlap will produce a true conflict
of laws.227 The question is not whether one state's laws are incompatible with
another state's laws; rather, the question is whether both states can apply their
laws and have a compelling interest in doing so. If they do not have such an
interest, there is merely a false conflict and the problem is resolved.
228
It turns out that many potential conflicts are not, upon further inspection,
conflicts at all.229 By identifying the interest that a state has in regulating a
particular piece of data, and the purpose the state has in regulating it, courts
225. As Goldsmith noted about Internet jurisdiction over a decade ago, this is consistent
with the overall trend in conflicts jurisprudence. See id. at 1208 ("Any number of
choice-of-law regimes are now consistent with constitutional and international law.
The earlier belief in a unique governing law for all transnational activities has given
way to the view that more than one jurisdiction can legitimately apply its law to the
same transnational activity.").
226. This fairly describes the scenario in the Microsoft Corp. case, although Ireland has not
explicitly argued that a conflict of laws exists. See Brief of Amicus Curiae Ireland, supra
note 11, at 3.
227. See Kramer, supra note 31, at 292-93.
228. Id. Note that a true conflict can exist even if ruling that state A's laws apply would put a
party in the position of violating the laws of state B.
229. See id. at 291-304.
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can often easily decide which state's interest should prevail in a given conflict.
Suppose, for example, that the United States passes a law designed to promote
entrepreneurship online. The law has provisions calling for, among other
things, cybersecurity standards and data integrity standards. Now suppose that
the U.K. law enforcement agents investigating a crime discover that they need
access to a drug smuggler's e-mail account, an account that is managed by an
Internet service provider that is subject to the U.S. law. In theory, this is a
potential conflict because there is at least an overlap in jurisdiction. But in
reality, there is no conflict at all: as long as giving the data to the U.K. law
enforcement will not affect the U.S. goal of promoting entrepreneurship
online, as it seems unlikely to do, there is no true conflict of laws.
2. Weighing state interests
A longstanding feature of conflicts jurisprudence-as the Restatement
reflects in its reasonableness analysis-is the notion that courts could
determine choice-of-law matters by balancing the competing state interests
rather than relying solely on the location of the relevant activity.230 Rather
than ask simply where the harm occurred, courts ask which state has an
interest in seeing its laws enforced in the case.231 As Larry Kramer points out,
this is not just a matter of tallying interests on one side and balancing them
against the interests on the other side; rather, the interest analysis requires an
inquiry into the purpose of the relevant law.232 This is not the only approach
courts have adopted-courts also use the vested rights approach, a comparative
impairment approach, a better-law approach, and more.233 But the Supreme
Court in Socite Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale v. U.S. District Court largely
endorsed the Restatement's balancing of government interests approach in
foreign affairs cases.
234
This can be seen in a number of different areas of U.S. conflicts
jurisprudence, but the area most relevant for this inquiry is the way that U.S.
courts evaluate competing state interests in cases where evidence resides
overseas, the production of which may violate another nation's sovereignty
and or its substantive laws.235 For example, in United States v. Vetco Inc., a court
230. BRAINERD CURRIE, SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 183-84 (1963).
231. Id.
232. See Kramer, supra note 31, at 285 (describing the first step of his two-step process for
identifying conflicts).
233. See Goldsmith, Against Cyberanarchy, supra note 26, at 1207 n.32).
234. 482 U.S. 522, 543-44, 544 n.28 (1987) (endorsing the factors listed in the RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 437 (AM. LAW INST.
1987)).
235. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 442
reporters' note 7 ("Numerous decisions of United States courts have engaged in a
footnote continued on next page
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weighed the interest of the United States in prosecuting tax fraud against
Switzerland's interest in preserving business secrets and found for the United
States, ordering the production of bank documents held abroad.236 In that case,
the records were held by a U.S. corporation's subsidiary in Switzerland,
237
which U.S. courts have generally found to be responsible for the production of
documents held outside the United States.
238
More recently, in Linde v. Arab Bank, PLC, the Second Circuit affirmed a
district court decision to sanction a bank for failing to comply with an order to
compel bank records held abroad in jurisdictions where their disclosure was
illegal.239 There are many similar cases.
24°
In these cases, courts must ask not only whether it is acceptable to compel a
defendant to bring data into the state's territory, but also whether doing so
would affect another state's interest.241 This is a distinct question from whether
the data is within the state's jurisdictional reach; rather, this is about whether
compelling a defendant to bring into the state's jurisdiction documents that it
could otherwise not produce would offend the sovereignty of another state.
And the approach courts use in these cases is balancing the two states' interests
in the data.
This approach is not without costs.2 42 Indeed, one of the risks of this
approach is that courts, somewhat unpredictably, rely on the notoriously
balancing of interests, both in determining the appropriateness of discovery orders in
the face of foreign nondisclosure laws, Subsection (1)(c), and in considering sanctions
for noncompliance, Subsection (2)(c).").
236. 691 F.2d 1281, 1289-91 (9th Cir. 1981).
237. Id. at 1284.
238. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 442
reporters' note 10.
239. 706 F.3d 92, 95-96 (2d Cir. 2013).
240. See, e.g., United States v. Field, 532 F.2d 404, 407-09 (5th Cir. 1976) (holding that the
United States' interest in investigating crime outweighed the Cayman Islands' interest
in bank secrecy); United States v. First Nat'l City Bank, 396 F.2d 897, 902-05 (2d Cir.
1968) (requiring bank to produce documents in response to federal grand jury
subpoena, despite the bank's insistence that removing the documents from Germany
would expose the bank to civil and other penalties).
241. Linde, 706 F.3d at 98 (noting that courts must balance "(on the one hand) the interests of
foreign governments in enforcing their laws and the potential hardship created for the
Bank by its conflicting legal obligations, with (on the other hand) the interests of the
United States in enforcing its laws and plaintiffs' need for the material in pursuing
their claims").
242. Diplomatic tensions are one possible cost. See OFFICES OF THE U.S. ATTORNEYS,
CRIMINAL RESOURCE MANUAL § 279(B) (1997) ("[T]he use of unilateral compulsory
measures can adversely affect the law enforcement relationship with the foreign
country.").
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malleable concept of international comity243 to decide whether another
jurisdiction's interests weigh in favor of not compelling the evidence. For
example, in Ings v. Ferguson, the Second Circuit found that "fundamental
principles of international comity" dictated that two New York agencies
seeking records held by a Canadian bank were required to file letters rogatory
with a Canadian judge in order to determine whether the disclosures might
violate Canadian law.24 But unpredictability in the application of comity may
be a small price to pay for an approach to resolving conflicts that takes into
account the concerns of other states and solves jurisdictional disputes in a
decentralized, case-by-case manner. Such a system, as the next Part shows,
offers a number of advantages over a top-down, uniform set of limits for state
access to cloud data.
245
3. Reciprocity
Finally, one of the fundamental principles of conflicts jurisprudence is the
idea of reciprocity in the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments.
246
When one state enforces another state's judicial decision, it sometimes does so
on the condition that the first state would have done the same thing.247 For
states that regularly manage conflicts of laws, a reciprocity rule can work to
both states' advantage over time.2 48 This could easily be applied to the context
of cloud data. For example, American courts could agree to respond to foreign
law enforcement requests for data on an expedited basis if and only if the
request comes from a country that processes American government requests
for data expeditiously, a fact that could be established by affidavit from the
State Department or the Office of International Affairs at the DOJ. Moreover,
Congress could revise ECPA to allow for explicit reciprocity by allowing U.S.
companies to respond directly to foreign government requests for information
if and only if those requests come from countries that also allow their
243. For a summary of comity's malleability and unpredictability, see Michael D. Ramsey,
Escaping "International Comity,"83 IowA L. REV. 893 (1998).
244. 282 F.2d 149, 152-53 (2d Cir. 1960).
245. See infra Part V.D.
246. See John F. Coyle, Rethinking Judgments Reciprocity, 92 N.C. L. REV. 1109, 1111 (2014)
(describing the longstanding debate over reciprocity in enforcement of foreign
judgments).
247. See Katherine R. Miller, Playground Politic Assessing the Wisdom of Writing a Reciprocity
Requirement into US. International Recognition and Enforcement Law, 35 GEO. J. INT'L L.
239, 244-46 (2004).
248. See Kramer, supra note 31, at 343 ("[W]here the same conflict of interest arises
continuously, the parties can learn from one another-the long term costs of failing to
do so are simply too great.").
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companies to respond directly to U.S. government requests for data.249 This
may in fact be one way of discouraging blocking statutes.
B. Blocking Statutes
Suppose that an Internet company is incorporated in country A, but it
operates worldwide. The company stores customer data in a handful of
different countries, according to where customers happen to be, where storage
is cheaper, and so on. Suppose also that country A has passed two laws: one that
authorizes the government to seek warrants regarding customer data,
regardless of the data's location; and one that prohibits technology companies
from releasing data to other governments. Now suppose that country B passes
the same two laws. This is what happens when countries pass a law like ECPA,
which operates as both a shield and a sword.250 It is a shield insofar as it
prevents foreign governments from compelling data controlled by U.S.
companies,25 1 and a sword insofar as it forces companies to hand over data to
the U.S. government in accordance with certain procedures.252 The trick, as it
were, is determining how one country's ECPA can play nicely with another's.
Conflicts rules help. If courts can assert personal jurisdiction over a defendant,
they can enforce a judgment against that defendant's assets, wherever they are
located, unless doing so would lead to a gross violation of another country's
laws.253 This caveat ends up being important because a number of countries
have passed so-called "blocking statutes," which are intentionally designed to
prevent the production of evidence.
254
Courts consider blocking statutes as part of their interest analysis, but
relying on a blocking statute will not always help a litigant. In Societe
Internationale, a Swiss holding company had an adequate excuse for not
complying with an order to produce records where their production would
249. See Greg Nojeim, Ctr. for Democracy & Tech., MLAT Reform: A Straw Man Proposal
(2015), https://cdt.org/files/2015/09/2015-09-03-MLAT-Reform-Post-Final-1.pdf.
250. See Kerr, supra note 206 (noting that the SCA, as part of ECPA, "acts as both a shield and
a sword").
251. 18 U.S.C. § 2702(a)(3) (2014).
252. Id. § 2703(a)-(c).
253. See Simowitz, supra note 24, at 7 (noting that when a defendant's assets are located
outside the jurisdiction but the court has personal jurisdiction over the defendant,
"courts will generally restrain assets located elsewhere, unless the parties would be
subjected to a substantial risk of double liability or the restraint would so egregiously
violate foreign law that the asset would be rendered valueless").
254. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 442
reporters' note 4 (AM. LAW INST. 1987) ("Blocking statutes are designed to take
advantage of the foreign government compulsion defense by prohibiting the
disclosure, copying, inspection, or removal of documents located in the territory of the
enacting state in compliance with orders of foreign authorities." (citation omitted)).
Against Data Exceptionalism
68 STAN. L. REv. 729 (2016)
violate Swiss law, but the Supreme Court noted: "This is not to say that
petitioner will profit through its inability to tender the records called for....
It may be that in the absence of complete disclosure by petitioner, the
District Court would be justified in drawing inferences unfavorable to
petitioner .... "255 Thirty years later, in Soci'td Nationale, the Court held that a
U.S. district court could compel a French company to produce documents
related to an airplane accident despite the contention that doing so would
violate a French blocking statute.256 As the Restatement suggests, the case
represents the view that when a court has prescriptive and adjudicatory
jurisdiction, and blocking statutes frustrate the goal of enforcement, they "need
not be given the same deference by courts of the United States as differences in
substantive rules of law."
257
This is instructive because the real challenge to the smooth functioning of
conflicts principles as they apply to the cloud is not overlapping or conflicting
jurisdictions, but rather the existence of blocking statutes and in particular-
since the vast majority of the world's Internet users store their data with U.S.
firms-the U.S. blocking statute, ECPA. American technology firms are
prevented from releasing American-held content to foreign governments by
the clear requirements of the SCA.258 Interest analysis and other conflicts-of-
laws rules will have little effect in this scenario, as long as the statute prevents
U.S. data controllers from cooperating with foreign governments (or foreign
judgments in conflicts cases). ECPA, therefore, must be reformed, and this
should be done with conflicts principles in mind.
259
This discussion hopefully shows that a number of conflicts principles give
courts adequate tools to resolve jurisdictional disputes over data. Despite the
multiple grounds states have for asserting jurisdiction over data, fears about
overlapping and even conflicting jurisdictions are overblown. The real
concern is not jurisdictions that conflict, or even substantively inconsistent
laws, but rather blocking statutes that make it difficult for courts to find the
appropriate equilibrium point between one state's interest in law enforcement
and another state's interest in data privacy.
255. Societe Internationale pour Participations Industrielles et Commerciales, S.A. v.
Rogers, 357 U.S. 197,212-13 (1958).
256. Soci&t6 Nationale Industrielle A6rospatiale v. U.S. Dist. Court, 482 U.S. 522, 539-40, 544
n.29 (1987).
257. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 442
reporters' note 5.
258. 18 U.S.C. § 2702(a)(3) (2014).
259. See infra Part V.A.
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V. Implications for Law and Policy
The preceding parts suggest that cloud data is not so conceptually different
from other intangible assets, and that in any case, the distinction is one without
a difference as a matter of enforcement jurisdiction: states have wide latitude to
regulate their core interests-acts affecting their territory and their citizens-
and courts have wide latitude to balance state interests when they conflict. But
showing that cloud data is not conceptually novel does not resolve the very
real jurisdictional puzzles raised by the cloud. So what should be done? The
conflicts analysis above suggests that first, and perhaps most importantly,
Congress should modify any blocking statutes that prevent U.S.-based Internet
companies from cooperating with foreign law enforcement requests for data.
This means that the United States should revise ECPA so that it no longer acts
as a blocking statute, forcing all requests for data from U.S. companies through
the MLAT process. Second, courts should interpret ECPA's territoriality
requirements in light of the U.S. interest in cloud data-that is, by holding that
Congress intended ECPA to apply to information stored by U.S.-based firms
about U.S. persons-and balance competing state interests in cloud data
accordingly. Third, the United States should revise its MLAT procedures and
encourage other countries to do the same. Finally, the conflicts analysis above
suggests that the United States should adopt a decentralized, state-by-state
approach to state access to data in the cloud, rather than push for an
international treaty forged out of pixie dust.
A. Reforming ECPA
As the conflict in the Microsoft Corp. case shows, Congress must reform
ECPA to clarify its jurisdictional reach. But there is still the question of how to
strike the right balance between U.S. governmental interests in the data and
foreign governmental interests in that same data. That is, viewed from a
conflicts perspective, what set of reforms is optimal? First, the foregoing
suggests that a state's jurisdiction to regulate a particular piece of data flows
from its legitimate interest in that data, so any jurisdictional test ought to
reflect that fact. Second, in order to allow countries to enforce the law in cases
that affect their interests, and in order for courts to adjudicate freely any
jurisdictional disputes, ECPA must no longer act as a blocking statute.
Specifically, ECPA should be reformed to allow U.S. companies to hand over to
foreign governments their U.S.-stored electronic content when: (1) the data
belongs to a non-U.S. citizen, (2) it is being requested in connection with a law
enforcement or counterterrorism operation in which the state has a legitimate
interest, and (3) an independent third party (e.g., a judge, magistrate,
commission, etc.) has approved the request, (4) in reasonable accordance with
shared standards of due process and human rights.
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To be clear, the aim of these requirements is not to dictate as a normative
matter how such requests for data ought to be processed, but rather to design
the system to maximize appreciation of state interests and minimize conflicts.
Consider each of these elements in turn. The first requirement turns on the
nationality of the suspect whose data is being sought. It makes sense from a
conflicts-of-laws perspective both that the British government has an interest
in regulating the activity of its citizens, and that the American government has
much less of an interest doing so. To be sure, the United States has an interest
in regulating the global activities of American companies, but that can be done
without impeding fair and just attempts to enforce local laws. Of course, the
nationality of the suspect is not always clear to the Internet service provider, so
they can refuse to cooperate if law enforcement is unable to determine the
suspect's nationality.
Second, the requesting officers must be seeking the data as part of a
criminal or counterterrorism investigation in which the state has a legitimate
interest. The United States is well within its prescriptive jurisdiction to insist
that technology companies headquartered in the United States only comply
with another country's laws when those laws are legitimate; this is akin to
Congress mandating that U.S. firms not accept bribes, even where doing so
is legal or accepted practice.26° U.S. interests in dictating the conduct of
American firms should only be outweighed when there is some compelling
countervailing foreign government interest. Accordingly, U.S. firms ought to
be free to hand over data where the data is being requested by a state that has a
meaningful interest in that data. This may mean that the state must show that
the data relates to a crime that occurred or had significant effects on its soil,
or involved one of its citizens. This codifies the conflicts principle that
jurisdiction ought to track state interests.
261
Third, when law enforcement agents attempt to gain access to private data,
this request should be verified by an independent party-meaning someone
outside of the direct line of command of the law enforcement agents requesting
the data, whether that person is a judge, magistrate, or a commission. This is
not a normative claim about due process but rather a conflicts point. Without
this step, companies will be forced into the role of evaluating the urgency and
legitimacy of law enforcement requests, which no one wants-not companies,
not their users, and not law enforcement officials. Rather than delegate the
evaluation of the legitimacy of each request to the legal and policy teams at U.S.
260. See supra text accompanying note 195.
261. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
pt. IV, ch. 1, intro, note ("Territoriality and nationality remain the principal bases of
jurisdiction to prescribe, but in determining their meaning rigid concepts have been
replaced by broader criteria embracing principles of reasonableness and fairness to
accommodate overlapping or conflicting interests of states .... ").
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firms, that analysis should be done by an independent official in the requesting
state. This gives firms a clear rule to apply around the world, rather than
asking firms to evaluate requests on an ad hoc, country-by-country basis. This
is not to say that company review should not play a role in these requests; to
the contrary, it is absolutely critical, as outlined below. But companies should
review to ensure that the request meets the process requirements laid out in
ECPA and by local law, not determine the legitimacy of the request as a matter
of law enforcement necessity.
Finally, requests should be required to meet minimum shared standards of
due process and human rights. Under the current ECPA regime, foreign law
enforcement officials must prove to a U.S. judge that they have probable cause
(the Fourth Amendment standard) to obtain a warrant.262 Solving the problem
of American exceptionalism by requiring other countries to meet some other
American standard seems to defeat the purpose of reform. Many countries
have different due process standards in criminal investigations, and the rule
should be flexible enough to allow for a wide range of state interests to be
satisfied.263 That is not to say that the U.S. legislature cannot have an interest in
ensuring the quality of the standard used; of course they can.264 But rather than
articulate a standard in terms of American law, Congress could refer to a set of
widely accepted due process norms, or otherwise allow countries to establish
these norms on a mutually agreeable basis as part of a bilateral agreement. Of
course, there is no settled set of clearly defined norms as to the precise
requirements of criminal due process.265 But Congress could refer to a set of
principles derived from the larger "general principles of law recognized by
262. See 18 U.S.C. § 2703(a).
263. See, e.g., Frederick F. Schauer, English Natural Justice and American Due Procesr An
Analytical Comparison, 18 WM. & MARY L. REV. 47 (1976) (describing the differences
between British and American notions of due process, paying particular attention to
the scope and reach of the protections); David E. Shipley, Due Process Rights Before EU
Agencier The Rights of Defense, 37 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 1, 8-12 (2008) (describing the
basic due process rights in the European Union and noting some of their differences
from American law); Noriho Urabe, Rule of Law and Due Process A Comparative View of
the United States and Japan, 53 LAW & CONTEMP. PRoBS. 61, 61-63 (1990) (describing the
different meanings of rule of law and due process in Japan, the United States, the
United Kingdom, and Germany).
264. Indeed, scholars and judges have been urging Congress to act on this matter. See
Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 12, at 99 (Judge Lynch noting that "it would
be helpful if Congress would engage in that kind of nuanced regulation, and we'll all be
holding our breaths for when they do"); Kerr, supra note 6, at 416.
265. Cf Charles T. Kotuby Jr., General Principles of Law, International Due Process, and the
Modern Role of Private International Law, 23 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 411, 412-13 (2013)
(describing universal due process norms in broad terms).
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civilized nations."266 As the Restatement notes, there is some shared
understanding of what constitutes "fair procedure."267 Congress could refer to
these broad and somewhat vague international principles, while articulating a
floor on behavior based in human rights.
268
This proposal has a number of benefits. First, it has the benefit of relying
on international standards, rather than American ones, which should make it
more palatable to foreign law enforcement. Second, it frees companies to
comply directly with local law enforcement requests, reducing some of the
pressure that law enforcement currently places on Internet companies, and
reducing the likelihood that those agents will call for more surveillance or data
localization. Third, it protects users from unwarranted intrusions into their
privacy. Fourth, it does not put Internet companies in the position of making
arbitrary determinations about when to comply with foreign government
requests for data.
This proposal is distinct in important ways from other proposals for ECPA
reform, all of which have serious drawbacks. For example, the LEADS Act,
proposed by Senator Hatch, fixes some of the problems regarding U.S.
government attempts to get data stored abroad-it would allow U.S.
governments to access, via warrant, data about U.S. persons wherever it is
stored-but the Act says nothing about foreign governments' ability to get
access to that data, meaning that ECPA still acts as a blocking statute for
foreign governments.269 The ECPA Amendments Act, proposed by Senators
Leahy and Lee, also does little to resolve the blocking statute problem.270 Orin
Kerr comes closer by suggesting that disclosure by Internet providers to
foreign governments be voluntary-which would eliminate ECPA's blocking
features-but without any guidelines about when companies ought to comply
with foreign legal orders.271 Without these guidelines, the bill would do
nothing to promote the United States' interest in ensuring that American
companies offer their non-U.S. users minimum privacy protections.
266. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 102
reporters' note 1 (quoting Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38(1)(c)
(June 26, 1945)).
267. Id. § 102 cmt. b; see also BIN CHENG, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF LAW AS APPLIED BY
INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS 279 (1953) (describing the universal due
process principle of nemo debet esse judex in propria sua causa, which prohibits someone
from being the judge in her own case).
268. See WOODS, supra note 46, at 14.
269. SeeLaw Enforcement Access to Data Stored Abroad Act, S. 512, 114th Cong. (2015).
270. The Act is focused narrowly on requiring a warrant for all digital content, where
ECPA currently only requires a warrant for content stored for less than 180 days. See
Electronic Communications Privacy Act Amendments Act of 2015, S. 356, 114th Cong.
(2015).
271. Kerr, supra note 6, at 417-18.
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One possibility is to create a club-like system, modeled on the Visa Waiver
Program, where ECPA is reformed to suggest that only certain countries can
have access to data stored in the United States by U.S. service providers.
272
However, such a proposal effectively creates a club of preselected countries
who get access to data controlled by U.S. firms. A club model is less effective
than a standards-based model like the one proposed here because it will
unnecessarily anger the countries that are not included. Indeed, countries that
do not have significant demands for access to data stored in the cloud may
nonetheless take offense at being excluded from the club. Just as importantly,
clubs inspire anti-clubs, as the International Telecommunication Union
Internet governance debates demonstrated.273 If Congress hopes to avoid those
sorts of political clashes, it should avoid explicitly articulating winners and
losers. The stakes are somewhat higher than those in the Visa Waiver
Program. States that are excluded from that program can impose reciprocal
visa burdens on Americans visiting them. But in the digital realm, the response
by a state excluded from the club would be to demand data localization-




Before ECPA is revised, however, courts will have to resolve disputes
regarding ECPA's reach. The foregoing conflicts analysis should suggest to a
court that it has wide latitude to craft a resolution to such disputes. First, the
court could decide that ECPA has no extraterritorial reach. The text of the
statute says nothing about extraterritorial application, so the court could
simply apply the presumption against extraterritorial application and decline
to extend ECPA abroad.275 Second, even if the court decides that ECPA has
territorial limits, the court might create a test for locating the data that puts the
data within ECPA's reach-by defining the test as the location of the server that
was last accessed; the location of the user who last accessed the data; the
272. See Swire & Hemmings, supra note 100, at 33-37. For information on the Visa Waiver
Program, see Bureau of Consular Affairs, Visa Waiver Program, U.S. DEP'T STATE,
https://travel.state.gov/content/visas/en/visit/visa-waiver-program.html (last visited
Apr. 4, 2016).
273. See Danielle Kehl et al., Visualizing Swing States in the Global Internet Governance Debate,
NEW AM. WKLY.: OPEN TECH. INST. (Oct. 20, 2014), https://www.newamerica.org/oti
/visualizing-swing-states-in-the-global-internet-governance-debate.
274. See supra text accompanying notes 111-14.
275. The presumption dates to American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 357
(1909), which describes the rule that if there is any doubt, courts construe "any statute
as intended to be confined in its operation and effect to the territorial limits over
which the lawmaker has general and legitimate power."
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location of the user who first created the data; or any number of other tests.
Third, and finally, regardless of what the court thinks about the territoriality
of ECPA or the location of the data, the court should still balance competing
state interests in regulating the data.
Under a conflicts approach to adjudicating competing state claims over
access to data in the cloud, the state's legitimate interest in the data may matter
more than the location of the data or the company. Kerr has argued that the
court would only need to engage in a balancing of state interests if the court
decides that the SCA does not apply to the data-presumably because the data is
found to be extraterritorial-and the government could seek the data using a
subpoena.276 But it is unclear why a court would not also need to engage in the
same balancing test even if it decided that the SCA applied. The court in
Microsoft Corp., for example, might find that the relevant test for territoriality
under the SCA is where the company is headquartered-meaning that the SCA
applies to Microsoft regardless of where it stores its data-but that would not
stop the court from asking whether compelling a U.S. data controller to
provide data that it stores abroad implicates the interests of foreign
governments.
This insight relieves some of the pressure on the seemingly arbitrary
choice of articulating a single test for where data is located for the purposes of
the SCA. Given the morass of competing claims over how to define where data
is located for jurisdictional purposes, and the potential incompatibility of
different state laws, it may provide some relief to users to know that the
jurisdiction over their data is the same across service providers, many of which
have different terms of service regarding the location of their data, different
corporate structures, and different data distribution models. The second effect
is that courts will engage in a reciprocity analysis, just as they do in
enforcement of foreign judgments. This could have the salutary effect of
encouraging similar court behavior by fellow judges in other countries.
C. Improving Mutual Legal Assistance
Another implication of this analysis is that greater international
cooperation is needed. Indeed, the U.S. government's position in the Microsoft
Corp. case turns on the claim that requesting data from another jurisdiction via
MLAT takes too long.277 However the Microsoft Corp. case is decided, and
regardless of how ECPA is reformed, foreign governments will have occasion
to seek data that they are unable to compel and must ask for mutual legal
assistance (MLA). If receiving states did a better job processing MLAT requests,
it would relieve some of the pressure in the current system-pressure on
276. See Kerr, supra note 206.
277. See Brief for the United States of America, supra note 213, at 52-53.
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companies to comply with local law enforcement requests and pressure on law
enforcement to take drastic measures to get the data via other means.
There are a number of straightforward reforms that could be implemented
without legislative action to greatly speed up the MLA process.278 First, the
MLA process should be standardized and made electronic. This means that
requesting countries should use a single, standardized form that clarifies the
legal standard that must be met, and this form should be transmitted
electronically for faster processing.279 Ideally, such a system would be
developed by the DOJ and would include a tracking system so that the
requesting officer and the Internet service provider could track the progress of
the request as it travels through the MLA process. Second, the DOJ should
institute additional training of foreign law enforcement officers so that when
MLAT requests arrive at the DOJ, they are complete and meet the U.S.
probable cause standard. Third, the DOJ critically needs more staff to handle
incoming MLA requests-not only legal staff but also translators to assist when
requests come in another language.280 Fourth and finally, the OIA should take
steps to increase the transparency of the MLA process. This should include
issuing an annual report notifying the public of the number and nature of the
requests that the office processed each year.28 1 It would also include ensuring
that Internet companies are aware that the warrants they receive are being
served on behalf of a foreign government. This is critical because many major
Internet companies now produce transparency reports and they necessarily
record some requests from foreign governments as U.S. government requests
because that is how they appear.28
2
D. The Case Against a Global Treaty
As more and more personal data is stored in the global cloud, and state
jurisdiction over that data overlaps to a greater degree, how can states
harmonize their laws so as to mitigate these conflicts? One approach would be
to push for a broadly supported multilateral agreement.283 Such an agreement
is appealing for a number of reasons. First, a treaty could explicitly demarcate
278. See WooDs, supra note 46, at 14.
279. Unbelievably, many requests for mutual legal assistance are still made by paper and
transmitted via diplomatic pouch. See id. at 8.
280. See id. at 10.
281. This is a welcome feature of the proposed Law Enforcement Access to Data Stored
Abroad Act, S. 512,114th Cong. (2015).
282. WOODS, supra note 46, at 11.
283. See Goldsmith, Against Cyberanarchy, supra note 26, at 1210 (suggesting that Internet
jurisdictional conflicts can theoretically, if not practically, be resolved by international
agreements).
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the jurisdictional limits of government access to cloud-based data. Second, the
treaty could articulate the basis for dispute resolution in the event of
jurisdictional conflict. Such uniformity in state policy would provide users,
Internet companies, and law enforcement agents much-needed predictability
about when governments can get access to Internet data.284 Finally, an
agreement could articulate a mechanism for government-to-government data
sharing-where state A seeks access to data that the treaty deems to be properly
under the authority of state B, the treaty could articulate a basis for the two
states to share the data.
285
But an international agreement of this sort is both practically unnecessary
and normatively undesirable. It is unnecessary because conflicts-of-laws rules
already provide a ready-made mechanism for navigating and settling
jurisdictional disputes. As private international law scholars have shown, state-
based conflicts-of-laws rules provide more flexibility and adaptability over
time than a comparatively rigid and inflexible treaty regime.
286
Perhaps more importantly, such an agreement would either be ineffective
or dangerous. It is a dangerous proposition because in order to get a broad
number of states to agree to an international treaty, that agreement will
necessarily be based on a lowest common denominator, which would represent
a significant threat to due process.287 Alternatively, if the agreement begins
with a small club of like-minded states with robust due process protections-as
some have proposed288-it will be small and therefore do little to solve the
hardest conflicts cases. A better approach would be to rely on a few simple
conflicts principles.
Conclusion
In the end, data exceptionalists-those who argue that data challenges
territorial conceptions of sovereignty and therefore cries out for a global
treaty-have it wrong. Despite the cloud's seemingly magical qualities-
284. See WOODS, supra note 46, at 4-5 (describing the interests of various stakeholders
implicated in MLAT reform).
285. See id. at 15-16.
286. See Riles, supra note 191, at 105-06 (characterizing the development of legal rules
through conflicts of laws cases as a flexible and decentralized alternative to the
comparatively rigid and centralized treaty process).
287. See Stephen J. Schulhofer, An International Right to Privacy?: Be Careful What You Wish
for 15 (N.Y.U. Pub. Law & Legal Theory Working Papers, No. 508, 2015), http://lsr
.nellco.org/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1511&context=nyu-plltwp ("One obvious
obstacle to a broad international agreement is the wide-probably unbridgeable-gulf
between privacy commitments in the West and in many undemocratic governments.").
288. See Brown et al., supra note 20, at 34-35; Time for an International Convention on
Government Access to Data, supra note 20.
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location independence, lightning speed, interchangeability of data-these
features are neither novel nor unique enough to support the data exceptionalist
view. Courts have dealt with similar features in determining jurisdiction over
a wide range of globally distributed and mobile assets, such as money, debts,
and more. Moreover, regardless of the novelty of data's essential properties,
age-old jurisdictional principles provide a solid foundation for countries to
regulate people and property that affect national soil, and that often means
compelling parties to produce evidence regardless of its location. Data will be
no different. This fact will of course cause conflicts of laws. But transnational
conflicts are not new; indeed, courts have a set of tools precisely designed to
address and mitigate such conflicts.
A more grounded and realistic analysis of the jurisdictional questions
raised by the global cloud is a sensible starting place for considering reforms.
Rather than declaring that data is entirely novel and therefore calls for
sweeping and novel solutions, reformers should attempt to regulate the global
cloud mindful of the jurisdictional principles that undergird each state's
authority. Rather than attempt to wipe away all potential conflicts of laws
with a wishful global treaty, for example, a more realistic and productive
reform strategy would be to seek to remove existing obstacles to the smooth
functioning of conflicts rules so that countries can regulate their interests, and
courts can adjudicate disputes as they arise. The most pressing of these reforms
is not to prevent states from asserting extraterritorial jurisdiction over data, as
many have suggested; rather, it is to remove blocking statutes where they
prevent global Internet companies from complying with local law. For the
United States, where most of the world's biggest Internet companies are based,
this means revising ECPA, and doing so in a way that balances foreign state
interests in American-controlled ata with the U.S. interest in ensuring that
American companies do not violate American values.
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